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ARTICLE 
IMPLICIT COMPARATIVE LAW*
par Roderick A. MACDONALD**
Kate GLOVER*** 
La littérature contemporaine en droit comparé est tributaire, tant dans ses aspects 
méthodologique que théorique, de réflexions méticuleuses et fouillées cherchant à identifier 
l'essence, les objectifs et les limites de la discipline. Malgré les contributions créatives de ces 
démarches, la plupart des analyses demeurent attachées aux conceptions du droit définies par 
les frontières traditionnelles, que celles-ci soient officielles, explicites ou externes. Cet article 
s'attarde plutôt à imaginer le droit comparé débarrassé de ses liens avec le positivisme étatique, 
lui préférant une approche fondée sur le pluralisme juridique. Dans cette perspective, les 
individus plutôt que les agents des systèmes officiels sont les acteurs au cœur du juridique (et 
du comparé). De plus, cette approche ne présume pas la supériorité des formes explicites de 
normativité, reconnaissant autant d'influence aux éléments implicites inhérents à tout ordre 
juridique. Finalement, elle valorise les comparaisons en jeu dans les actes quotidiens et les 
interactions de tous les jours entre les individus. Ultimement, l'article offre une réponse à la 
question : les comparaisons de qui, de quel droit, selon quels axes, par quelle méthode, dans 
quel but? 
Contemporary comparative law scholarship has been enriched, methodologically and 
theoretically, by careful, searching accounts of the essence, aims and limits of the comparative 
legal endeavour.  Yet, despite creative contributions to the field, most scholarly analyses remain 
tethered to conceptions of law demarcated by traditional boundaries – the official, the explicit 
and the external.  In this paper, we contemplate what comparative law would look like if its 
practitioners abandoned their attachment to state legal positivism and adopted instead an 
approach grounded in a pluralist hypothesis of law.  The alternative that we envision, which 
posits individuals rather than agents of official systems as the central legal (and comparative) 
actors. Moreover, it does not privilege explicit forms of normativity over the equally influential 
tacit forms that are inherent in all legal orders. Finally, this approach values the comparisons 
at stake in the everyday actions and interactions of individuals.  Ultimately, we offer a response 
to the question: Whose comparisons, of what law, along which axes, by what method, to what 
end?   
* . This is a revised version of a presentation given at the 50th Anniversary 
Conference of the Québec Society of Comparative Law held at the Faculté 
de droit de l’Université de Sherbrooke on October 28-29, 2011.  The 
authors are grateful to the conference participants for their thoughtful 
comments on an earlier version of this paper and to Patrick Glenn for his 
insight into the authoritative texts of comparative law. We would also like 
to thank Hoi Kong, Tom McMorrow, Robert Leckey, Alexandra Popovici and 
Lionel Smith who read and critiqued the penultimate version.  Finally, we 
are grateful to the two anonymous reviewers whose questions have 
enabled us to clarify certain arguments in parts of the text that they found 
underdeveloped.  All errors and inconsistencies remain our own. 
** . F.R. Scott Professor of Constitutional and Public Law, McGill University; 
F.R.S.C. 
*** . D.C.L. Candidate, McGill University; Vanier Canada Graduate Scholar
(2012-2015); O’Brien Fellow for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism (2010-
2012).
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper re-imagines the meta-framework and objects of 
comparative law.1 Like traditional approaches to comparative law, 
the framework we propose celebrates comparison as a rich and 
instructive source of legal knowledge.  Like more modern, but 
nonetheless orthodox, approaches, our framework is fundamentally 
concerned not just with the identification and comparison of norms, 
concepts and institutions, but also with what law and society 
scholars call internormativity – the interaction and movement of 
these norms, concepts and institutions between legal orders. Yet, 
unlike both traditional and modern conceptions of comparative law, 
we do not structure the comparative endeavour by reference only to 
political units (states); nor do we limit our inventory of comparative 
objects to official legal artefacts such as statutes and judicial 
decisions or to exegetical doctrinal understandings of these 
artefacts. Rather, the organizing meta-framework of the alternative 
we offer sees normative plurality and the challenge of comparison 
in the everyday actions of individual legal agents.  We conceive each 
legal agent, inappropriately reduced to a passive “norm subject” in 
traditional analysis, as the mediator of identity and difference 
among the multiple legal orders in which she or he is situated.  This 
alternative, agent-centred meta-framework is the foundation of 
what we call implicit comparative law.  
 
The hypotheses and methods of implicit comparative law are 
relatively easy to formulate in the abstract. But, since we believe 
that a particularly powerful mechanism for learning, interpreting 
and assessing a body of knowledge and for perfecting a methodology 
appropriate to the task is to attempt their teaching, we decided to 
                                                 
1.  In view of the manner in which we have chosen to present this re-
imagination, for the most part we forego point-by-point footnoting for the 
ideas and themes raised in the text.  The section entitled “Primary 
Reference Materials” (II.D) and the Annotated Bibliography that appears 
as an Appendix to this paper provide a conspectus of how some 
comparative law scholars have addressed the central questions evoked in 
this essay, and, where instructive, further characterization of some works 
cited in the footnotes.   
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elaborate upon our argument by exploring what would be involved 
in the endeavour of teaching implicit comparative law.  
 
One model for law teaching that incorporates the insights of 
implicit comparative law (and we acknowledge that there could be 
several such models) is reflected in what has come to be known as 
the “Transsystemic Programme” at McGill University’s Faculty of 
Law. The architects of the Programme orchestrated a shift from a 
side-by-side presentation of civil law and common law courses, for 
example, contracts or successions, to a curricular structure that 
does not presuppose the salience of either civil law or common law 
traditions to the framing of course content.  A transsystemic 
pedagogical practice is not exhausted by merely teaching an 
upgraded version of orthodox comparative law – comparative law 
2.0, if you will – whereby a higher dimension of comparison or 
abstraction is layered onto traditional instantiations of bi-systemic 
or bi-jural investigations. Rather, transsystemic teaching and 
learning oblige participants – teachers, learners – to undertake a 
new inquiry into human interaction, human purposes, and the 
variety of normative modes and sites within which human agency 
is pursued.2 In its present and aspirational forms, the McGill 
Programme aligns with the aims and ambitions of the implicit 
comparative law approach that we present in this paper in that it 
tries to capture a practice of teaching and learning that is 
simultaneously pluralist, polycentric, non-positivist, interactive, 
and, of course, comparative.  
 
In drawing on the McGill example, we could have organized 
our discussion of teaching implicit comparative law so as to focus 
on the macro level – an entire programme of undergraduate studies 
in law.  Instead, to keep the scope of this paper manageable, we 
have chosen to imagine what the teaching of an individual course 
would entail if we were to adopt implicit comparative law as its 
                                                 
2.  This conception of transsystemic teaching and learning is developed in 
Roderick A. MACDONALD, « Is Law a Zoo? », Paper presented to the Annual 
Meeting of the Canadian Law and Society Association, Concordia 
University, Montreal, QC, 4 June 2010 [unpublished manuscript on file 
with the authors]. 
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organizing framework.  Again, we could have selected any law 
faculty course for this purpose. But to emphasize both the 
theoretical and methodological features of our approach, we have 
chosen to develop our argument by reference to (and in 
counterpoint to) the themes and objectives of traditional 
introductory courses on comparative law as these have been taught 
in the past at the Faculty of Law of McGill University.  
 
Below, we present the main features of our proposed course 
in the form of a course syllabus, organized into the following 
sections: (A) Synopsis and Rationale, (B) Course Objectives, 
(C) Specific Learning Outcomes, (D) Primary Reference Materials, 
(E) Course Content and Pedagogical Approach, (F) Assignments and 
Assessment, (G) Feedback, and (H) Week-by-Week Outline of 
Seminar Sessions.3  The material we canvass under each of these 
headings, with the exception of the Outline of Seminar Sessions, is 
divided into two parts.  In the first (italicized) part, we set out the 
actual content of the syllabus for our proposed course.  In the 
second part, entitled Commentary, we point to and explore the 
bases of our curricular and pedagogical choices.  The Commentary 
would not be distributed to students but rather is meant to serve 
as a Teacher’s Manual of sorts.  The italicized text could, 
consequently, be read straight through in its entirety, without 
reference to Commentary.4  Our discussion ends with an Annotated 
                                                 
3.  This is not to say that the syllabus presented here exhausts the scope and 
content of a syllabus for an implicit comparative law course.  Such a 
syllabus could also set out, for example, a detailed review of the obligatory 
course materials, teaching hours, class cancellations, office hours and 
instructor contact information, preparation for and participation in the 
course, pedagogical instruments (e.g. course website, discussion forum), 
and class-by-class learning outcomes.  For a discussion of the 
considerations at stake in the process of syllabus construction, see 
Roderick A. MACDONALD, « Designing a Syllabus: A Nine-Yards Template », 
Paper delivered at the Professing to Educate: Educating to Profess 
Conference at the Faculty of Law, McGill University, Montreal, QC, July 
2003 [unpublished manuscript on file with the authors]. 
4.  Moreover, as we hope will become clear in the course of working through 
the syllabus and the interspersed Commentary, the unusual organization 
of this essay is intended to reveal one possible framework for an implicit 
comparative law approach to legal study.  We neither hold nor seek a 
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Bibliography, in which we extend the exploration of the foundations 
and themes of implicit comparative law by providing a blueprint for 
deeper inquiry, engagement and reflection.5   
 
Before turning to the elaboration of our course, we think it 
useful to foreground the three cardinal ideas about our 
understanding of implicit comparative law that will emerge as we 
work through the syllabus. First, we see the course itself as a site 
of law.  Students will be challenged to notice how their approach to 
course materials and to the process of learning reflects the same 
intellectual activity as their approach to, and understanding of, law: 
students will be agents in the elaboration of the specific normative 
order constituted by their participation in the course.6 Second, the 
idea of implicit comparative law rests on a particular theory of law 
– critical legal pluralism – that rejects the premises of state legal 
positivism, the legal theory that invariably underpins orthodox 
approaches to comparative law.7  Third, the idea of implicit 
                                                 
monopoly on imagining – or setting the outer limits of – the spectrum of 
configurations for such an approach.  Indeed, a cornerstone of the seminar 
we present here is the expectation that all participants will consistently re-
imagine and transform the approach we offer into their own understanding 
and practice of implicit comparative law. 
5.  Normally in a course syllabus, the Annotated Bibliography would follow 
the week-by-week outline of seminar sessions as an Appendix.  But given 
the length of our bibliography and its pertinence to this paper as a whole, 
we have displaced the Annotated Bibliography to the very end of this essay 
so that our Conclusion (which, like this Introduction, is not actually a part 
of the syllabus) comes directly after the last substantive section of the 
syllabus. 
6.   Put slightly differently, the course is itself meant to be performative of what 
implicit comparative law entails as an intellectual endeavour.  Hence, we 
conceive and present every feature of the course – teaching approach, 
materials, evaluations, feedback, etc. – in the light of this approach, 
suggesting in the accompanying Commentary the implicit comparative 
dimension of each section. 
7.  We acknowledge that many contemporary theories, such as that advanced 
by H.P. Glenn, also do not rest on the state legal positivist approach, even 
though they are not grounded in pluralist approaches. The basic premises 
of the critical legal pluralist hypothesis and their role in the implicit 
comparative law approach will be developed in the Commentary to section 
II.B of the syllabus. 
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comparative law also rests on a specific conception of legal 
normativity – one that does not privilege explicit normativity of the 
type reflected in legislation and the outputs of bureaucratic law-
applying institutions like courts, but rather gives equal weight to 
practice, custom and purposive interaction as instances of an 
equally powerful tacit normativity inherent in all legal orders.8  
 
II. IMPLICIT COMPARATIVE LAW: A SYLLABUS  
 
A. Synopsis and Rationale 
 
From almost our earliest moments, we learn to distinguish 
ourselves from other things in the world – animate and inanimate. As 
we grow, our capacity for recognizing the separateness and 
distinctiveness of things matures into a similar capacity for 
differentiating between behaviours and between ideas. At the same 
time, we develop a capacity to perceive similarity and to impose 
second-order categories to regroup what might initially appear to be 
disparate phenomena. Through these processes of differentiation 
and regrouping we seek to order our universe.  Characterization and 
organization per genus et differentium are two of the many building 
blocks that enable us to expand the range of usable knowledge by 
which we orient our lives, undertake purposive actions and maintain 
intellectual coherence through time.  
 
The modes and processes of our formal legal education are no 
different. For example, in Canadian law faculties, whatever the 
province, the core curriculum is organized around a prior (and usually 
unstated) definition of the field of inquiry (i.e. what constitutes law), 
and on canonical categories (public law, private law), sub-categories 
(property, obligations), and sub-sub-categories (contracts, torts, 
restitutionary claims) that we impose on certain legal norms, 
concepts, processes and institutions.  Yet even as we learn to deploy 
                                                 
8.  Given the emphasis on informal and implicit normativity it might be 
thought that the title of our proposed course should be Comparative 
Implicit Law, rather than Implicit Comparative Law.  The distinction 
between the content captured by these two course titles is elaborated in 
the Commentary to section II.A of the syllabus. 
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these taxonomies, we are also meant to learn the contingency of the 
assumptions upon which they rest, and the possibilities for 
alternative ways of organizing ideas and experiences. Often this 
insight comes from a careful analysis of cases and hypothetical 
situations that do not fit neatly into the pre-ordained categories. 
Other times, it comes from simply trying to imagine the world 
differently, particularly when our imagination is fired by some legally 
exogenous theoretical framework such as Marxism, welfare 
economics, or critical feminism. Occasionally, a course, a professor, 
a text or an assignment will aim to destabilize the known (the 
acknowledged body of legally relevant materials and ideas) by 
directly referencing the unknown (the exotic or more generally, the 
other). Conventionally, this extroversion to the unfamiliar, to the 
foreign, is, in law faculties, the province of comparative law.  
 
The desire to expand intellectual horizons and advance the 
protocols for learning about the familiar through sustained 
engagement with the unfamiliar under a logic that presupposes the 
discovery or invention of similarity are the drivers of comparative 
legal study. Not surprisingly, comparative legal analysis – whether 
temporal or spatial – occurs every day in every course, usually 
without being expressly identified as such. For example, whenever 
you are subjected to a litany of hypothetical factual variations at the 
margins of a legal proposition – the so-called Socratic Method – you 
are being pushed to hone your capacity to characterize and 
differentiate on a comparative basis.  In addition to comparison 
focusing on the minor premise of a legal syllogism (the facts), at some 
point or another, most courses engage you in the comparison of 
different modes of stating the major premise (the legal rule).  
Comparison of this latter type is the standard case of what scholars 
reference by the expression comparative law.   
 
Where the call to engage in the comparative endeavour is 
explicit, and is a central objective of a course, the course title 
invariably signals the point, although not always with the word 
comparative. So, for example, temporal comparative law courses – 
involving the comparison of legal propositions, concepts and 
institutions of a single legal order at different moments – invariably 
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attract the epithet history as part of the title: Canadian legal history, 
history of private law, the adversarial system in historical 
perspective, and so on.  Spatial comparative law courses, by contrast, 
are almost always labeled as comparative: comparative law, 
comparative legal traditions, comparative civil procedure, 
comparative medical liability, and so on.  
 
We begin this course by considering orthodox approaches to 
the comparative study of law.  These approaches rest on various 
assumptions about the meaning of law, the identity of legal actors, 
the purpose and value of comparison, the relationship between legal 
artefacts, the dynamics of normative interaction and norm migration, 
and the appropriate subjects of legal knowledge.  Until recently, 
broad consensus has favoured these assumptions and the 
boundaries of comparative law they trace have been taken for 
granted. This is no longer the case.  Contemporary comparative law 
scholarship is both theoretically and methodologically rich. Many 
monographs and articles focus on interrogating orthodox approaches 
to comparative legal study.  Indeed, some comparative law courses 
today make such questioning one of the primary components of the 
tuition.  
 
This course seeks to push inquiry of this latter type even 
further. We ask that you be willing not only to debate internal 
controversies about the province and function of comparative legal 
study, but also to challenge the givens of comparative law by actively 
questioning the givens of law.  One might frame this intellectual 
endeavour as one of applied legal theory: must comparative legal 
analysis accept a state-centric, legal positivist conception of law as 
its epistemic foundation?  how would the questions of comparative 
law be phrased if one were to adopt, for example, an anthropological 
or a sociological approach to defining law? or a Thomistic Natural 
Law approach? or a legal realist approach? or a critical race theory 
approach?  or a law and economics approach? Posing these questions 
invites us to consider a brace of different theories of comparative law.  
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In doing so, we will be studying the comparative law of comparative 
law.9 
 
Although our comparative exploration is not intentionally 
polemical, we acknowledge that this course, like any other, has an 
identifiable underpinning and orientation.  We entitle this course 
‘Implicit Comparative Law’ because it rests on a particular theory of 
law – critical legal pluralism – that (1) draws no sharp pedigree-
boundaries around the specific normative phenomena that count as 
law, and (2) accepts a multiplicity of normative systems not created 
or validated by the political state as meaningful comparative 
constructs.   
 
Our instantiation of this course carries no claim as to its own 
necessity or sufficiency. We accept, as is consistent with a 
commitment to the critical legal pluralist hypothesis, that the 
curricular arrangements and coverage of implicit comparative law 
courses can be heterogeneous: multiple, flexible and variable.  This 
said, you have before you the syllabus for a particular implicit 
comparative law course.  This syllabus, like the syllabus of any other 
course, is the product of many inputs: it derives not just from orthodox 
perspectives on the subject; it is also shaped by our own 
understandings of the course’s potential, which is inextricably rooted 
in the intellectual journeys we each took (and which we continue to 
pursue) to arrive at these understandings. Given the anti-
foundationalist premises of the course, we believe it important to 
state, as best we can, how this course came to be designed as it is.  
To that end, in the next few paragraphs, we briefly map our separate 
routes to this instantiation, of this course, in this faculty, at this time.   
                                                 
9.  We have chosen to formulate the inquiry as the “comparative law” of 
“comparative law” rather than simply “comparative comparative law” 
because we see the endeavour of doing comparative law as itself normative. 
The different instantiations of inquiry, methods of exploration, modes of 
analysis and navigation between comparators at stake in carrying out the 
various theories and analyses – that is, the different manifestations and 
outcomes of the practice of comparative law – are not merely 
distinguishable on epistemological grounds.  Rather, these variables 
diverge and collide in substantive and programmatic ways, ways with 
normative effect for the practitioners of comparative law.   
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Rod’s intellectual journey  
 
For me, the idea of implicit comparative law arose from a 
rather belated realization that my approach to comparative law was 
grounded in a conception of law – state legal positivism – that was 
directly in opposition to beliefs I claimed to hold when I was doing 
legal theory or teaching my courses in administrative law and 
secured transactions. In these other courses I consciously adopted a 
critical legal pluralist theoretical framework.  Once that light bulb 
went on, I began to explore how other scholars were teaching and 
writing about comparative law, and to compare that with how they 
taught and wrote about other legal matters.  I discovered that a few, 
though certainly not the majority, were living the same dissonance 
between rich, contextualized conceptions of legal normativity as 
reflected in the substantive fields of their teaching and research, and 
the rather one-dimensional, state positivist conception of legal 
normativity that grounded the objects and processes of their 
comparative scholarship. 
 
In undertaking this inquiry, I noted the preponderance of 
articles like “the officious intermeddler in common law and civil law”, 
or “the German advantage in civil procedure”, or “does the common 
law need a concept of ‘persons’?”or “existe-t-il un droit occidental?”.  
Whether the comparison was of doctrinal structure or functional 
outcome, the objects of comparison were explicit artefacts of two or 
more political states.   
 
More curiously, the scholarship of even those who claimed to 
be doing second-order comparative law theory was largely anchored 
in the comparative assessment of these artefacts.  Whether the genus 
of inquiry was described as a “family” (as in Rheinstein), a “system” 
(as in Wigmore, in David and Brierley or in Schlesinger), or a 
“tradition” (as in Merryman), the different species being examined 
were almost always state legal orders.  While some scholars also 
attended to religious legal orders (Daube), and customary legal 
orders (Malinowski), until my colleague Patrick Glenn brilliantly 
changed the register of inquiry and analysis, these other 
manifestations of law were largely consigned to the margins.   
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Finally, I noticed that because the focus was on the law of the state, 
the normative contributions of all the other types of legal orders 
operative within a given community were not recognized as such, but 
were recharacterized as “fact”.  The traditional tropes “law in action”, 
or “culture” or “brute functionalism” became handy covers for 
avoiding having to confront these recalcitrant “facts” as reflections of 
competing normative orders. The comparative endeavour was cast in 
one of two models.  Many scholars sought to compare legal traditions 
associated with dominant political regimes – civil law, common law, 
socialist law, for example – or to compare variations on these generic 
categories: Italian civil law, French civil law, German civil law, on the 
one hand, and English common law and American common law, on 
the other.  The other way of proceeding was to compare the legal 
systems of particular states, exploring the relationship between, say, 
the law of Quebec and the law of Ontario.  Until very recently, few 
scholars sought to track the relationship between Quebec civil law 
and canon law, or between sharia law, Talmudic law and canon law 
as observed in Montreal, or between, say, any of the above and the 
living law of particular segments of the business community.  
 
And so, I began to explore what would happen if I mapped my 
research (1) into the interactional bases of law, (2) into implicit and 
inferential legal normativity and (3) into legal pluralism onto my 
reflections about the scope and methods of comparative law.  This 
course is the consequence of that effort. 
 
Kate’s intellectual journey  
 
My formal interaction with implicit comparative law – that is, 
the first step on my intellectual journey towards this instantiation of 
this course – began when Rod introduced me to the term "implicit 
comparative law" and sketched for me one possible understanding of 
its meaning. My journey began, therefore, where the story of Rod’s 
journey ends.      
 
My first step naturally propelled a second. Being introduced to 
the idea of a body of knowledge and an approach called "implicit 
comparative law" compelled me to reflect upon my own experience 
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with what I understood comparative law (simpliciter) to be. In 
undertaking this reflection, I came to realize that my exposure to, and 
engagement with, comparative law up to that point could be wholly 
described in the language of doctrinal analysis, the functional 
approach and instrumentalism.  These descriptors applied equally to 
my tenure as a masters student in law (my LL.M. thesis, written in 
conjunction with a graduate seminar on comparative law, was 
entitled “Resolving the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’: A Comparison of 
Adversarialism and its Limits in England and Canada”) and as a 
lawyer in traditional private practice (Is it more favourable for my 
client to pursue legal action in Canada or the United States? Should 
I invoke judicial interpretations of the Quebec Charter’s privacy 
guarantees in my submissions on federal constitutional 
interpretation?).  This methodological conception of comparative law 
was useful in the contexts in which I invoked it.  However, as I have 
also realized, its narrow scope stands in tension with the 
comparative dimensions of my doctoral research, in which I position 
orthodox analyses and observations about an archetypal legal 
institution (the Supreme Court of Canada) beside alternatives in order 
to explore what can be learned about the nature of law from the study 
of the Court as an institution, and what can be learned about the 
Court as an institution from the study of the nature of law.           
 
And so followed the third step on my journey: exploring how 
my understanding of "comparative law" fit with my understanding of 
"law" or, more accurately, with my growing sense of dissatisfaction 
with understanding law as merely an autonomous, top-down, state-
centric phenomenon.  Here, at this third step, it became clear to me 
that: (1) I was engaged in a process of deconstructing the hypotheses 
of implicit comparative law and of exploring the possibility of 
reconstructing those hypotheses in a personally compelling way; and 
(2) this process asked of me the same questions that I was facing as 
a doctoral student in law at the formative stages of scholarly inquiry 
and research design: What is law? What is legal knowledge? What 
are its sources, categories, methods, methodologies and institutions? 
How are they structured and ordered? With what does law (or do 
laws) interact? On what scale? How does our understanding of law 
shape our inquiry into it? How do conceptions of law impact law’s 
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institutional arrangements? And, the pivotal question underlying all 
the others, who am I in relation to law? 
   
My contribution to this course reflects my efforts to answer – 
and to urge you, as students of law, to pursue your own answers to 
– these questions. Ultimately, the steps on a journey towards an 
understanding of implicit comparative law are intermediate steps on 
the ongoing pursuit of understanding the interaction between law, 
society, knowledge and self.   
 
***** 
 
Commentary: 
 
A syllabus aims at answering a common student question, 
“why should I take this course?”  It typically begins not only by 
introducing a course and providing an overview of its content 
(synopsis), but also by explaining how and why the course came to 
be (rationale).  The synopsis and rationale just presented seek to 
incite student reflection about the foundations of legal knowledge.   
 
Our course is anchored in the premise that comparison is a 
central component of the human quest for understanding.10  
Characterization and taxonomy are methodologies by which we 
distinguish categories of knowledge and experience and by which 
we invent and differentiate components of knowledge and 
                                                 
10.  If words matter, if actions matter, and if all human expressive 
communication matters (and we think they do), then the act and art of 
comparison, however carried out, also matter. Human beings constantly 
locate themselves and their artefacts by reference to their perceptions of 
others. As Jerome HALL, Comparative Law and Society Theory, Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1963, p. 9 observed, “to be 
sapiens is to be a comparatist”. Consider, as an example of the familiarity 
of comparative tendencies in everyday life, the multiplicity of linguistic 
devices by which we reference comparison.  They include metaphor, simile, 
analogy, paradox, irony and imagery.  Imagine the semantic deficit we 
would endure in the absence of these conventions.   
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unmediated experience.11  This observation resonates in equal 
measure on the macro scale of all human knowledge and on the 
discrete micro scale on which particular disciplines and specific 
sets and fields of knowledge are plotted.  Characterization and 
taxonomy are, on this account, vital instruments for discerning and 
assimilating legal knowledge.12  
 
In legal taxonomy the criteria of genus and differentium are 
usually of two main types: the conceptual and the functional.  The 
former posits features (whether phenomenal (sensory) or noumenal 
(cognitive)) by which particular identities may be established; the 
latter posits outcomes that particular identities produce or can be 
made to produce. But both approaches assume that legal 
knowledge exists prior to and independently of the commitments of 
the legal subject.  In contrast, from a critical legal pluralist 
perspective, legal subjects are central to the creation, navigation 
and intersection of potentially competing legal orders.13 The 
exercise of comparative law is, therefore, not independent of 
individual commitments or the visceral human connection to 
comparison, but rather a manifestation of them. 
                                                 
11.  On this account, characterization serves as the usual precedent of 
taxonomic efforts.  Through characterization, the salient, primordial or 
distinctive features of an independent unit are, consciously or 
unconsciously, identified.  The concern is one of essence.  Taxonomy, 
however, in both conceptualization and execution, attends to the 
processes and schemes of classification.  It implies the invocation of some 
system or arrangement of categories into which individual units can be 
slotted, distributed or classified.  
12.  One need only look to the American Restatements, the Canadian 
Abridgement, the Juris-Classeur in France or the organization of courses 
in any law faculty calendar as evidence of the taxonomic tendency in 
European and North American approaches to legal study.  Of course, there 
is a significant difference between vehicles like the Juris-Classeur, the 
organization of which follows the conceptual structure of the Code civil des 
français, and encyclopedias like the Canadian Abridgement that follow an 
alphabetical presentation of topics.  For a unique attempt to adopt the 
French model to the common law, see Andrew BURROWS  (ed.), Birks’ 
English Private Law, 2nd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, and 
in particular the Introduction to the first edition (2000), edited by Peter 
Birks, at pages xxxv-li. 
13.  See section II.B and the accompanying Commentary, below.   
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The scholarly attraction to comparative methods and 
subjects as touchstones of the study of law is signaled by the event 
for which this paper was written – the 50th Anniversary Conference 
of the Quebec Society of Comparative Law held in 2011.  It is also 
reflected in the number of longstanding associations and 
institutions dedicated to promoting and advancing comparative 
law14 as well as in the enormous literary deposit of comparative legal 
materials that has amassed over time.15  In this modern flourishing 
                                                 
14.  For example, the International Academy of Comparative Law (est. 1924), 
the American Society of Comparative Law (est. 1951), the British 
Association of Comparative Law (formerly the United Kingdom National 
Committee of Comparative Law) (est. 1956), the Swiss Institute of 
Comparative Law (est. 1982), the British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law (est. 1958), the Institute of European and Comparative 
Law (formerly the Centre for the Advanced Study of European and 
Comparative Law) (est. 1995), McGill’s Institute of Comparative Law 
(formerly the McGill Institute for Foreign and Comparative Law) (est. 1965) 
and the Paul-André Crépeau Centre for Private and Comparative Law 
(formerly the Quebec Research Centre of Private and Comparative Law) 
(est. 1975).  For general information on a number of these and other such 
associations, see Mathias REIMANN and Reinhard ZIMMERMANN (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2008. 
15.  See, for example, the extensive law library holdings in comparative law 
(e.g. a keyword search of the McGill University Library catalogue for 
“comparative law” reveals 21,779 holdings), prolific academic scholarship 
and engagement in the field (e.g. a sample of the English language journals 
includes the American Journal of Comparative Law, the International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly, the Journal of Comparative Law, the 
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law, the African Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, the Islamic & Comparative Law 
Quarterly, the ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law, the 
Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law, and the Oxford 
University Comparative Law Forum), and government and policy reports 
that invoke comparison across regimes (e.g. UNIFORM LAW CONFERENCE OF 
CANADA, Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation (SLAPPs) (and other 
abusive lawsuits), Ottawa, 2008, online: <http:// www.ulcc.ca/en/2008-
quebec-city-qc/235-civil-section-documents/448-strategic-lawsuits-
against-public-participation-slapps-report-2008> (page consulted on July 
25, 2013); DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, A Profile of Legal Aid Services in Family 
Law Matters in Canada, by Lorne D. BERTRAND et al., Ottawa, 2002).  Not 
everyone sees this literary output as evidence of comparative law’s 
flourishing.  See, notably, Mathias REIMANN, « The Progress and Failure 
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of comparative law, theoretical analyses often display an emerging 
disciplinary self-awareness.  This self-consciousness is manifest in 
epistemic shifts amongst comparative law thinkers. One such shift 
moves the comparative reflexes away from an overriding focus on 
process and method to an interest in substance and purpose.  
Consider, to take an example, the shift in emphasis reflected in the 
decision of the Quebec association that brings together comparative 
law scholars to change its name from the Quebec Association for 
the Comparative Study of Law (a name implying a focus on process, 
method and the "how" of comparative law), to its present 
designation, the Quebec Society of Comparative Law (a name 
suggesting a concern with the substantive objects and ambitions of 
comparative law).   
 
The post-WWII growth of comparative law has, however, 
given rise to a persistent orthodoxy that has (1) structured 
comparison as either essentialist or functionalist, (2) posited legal 
meta-phenomena (orders, systems, traditions and families) as the 
relevant categories of comparison, and (3) oriented the hypotheses 
of comparative law to the explicit, the formal and the momentary.  
Consider each component of this third characteristic of the 
orthodoxy. First, the analytical hypotheses of orthodox comparative 
law are focused on the explicit: whatever the method or subject of 
comparison, the artefactual comparator (norm, concept, domain of 
law, legal system, legal tradition) is a product of the modern political 
state or its surrogates, and whatever the unit of comparison 
(substantive or procedural rule, law-making or law-applying 
process, outcome), the focus is on practices and actions of officials 
and declarations by official institutions. Second, orthodox 
comparative law reveals its preoccupation with the formal insofar 
as it takes law to be an abstract, authoritative, exogenous artefact: 
law is to be identified by its pedigree, not by its purpose nor by the 
results that it in fact produces. Finally, the orthodox framework 
accepts the law as it exists at a given moment as its object: the 
comparison at stake is usually that of simultaneously existing 
                                                 
of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century », (2002) 
50 Am. J. Comp L. 671. 
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regimes, rather than the mechanisms and processes through which 
the current state of affairs has come to be.   
 
The orthodoxy we have just described is a necessary starting 
point for our proposed course.  Without a firm grasp of the heritage 
and contemporary practices of comparative law, the idea of implicit 
comparative law is hard to fathom. However, it is a commitment to 
questioning orthodoxy’s privileged place in the creation and 
perpetuation of legal knowledge that is the pedagogical propeller of 
this course: Why is the focus on artefacts and actions of the political 
state and not on the experiences and actions of individuals as legal 
agents? Why is law conceived of as an external force rather than a 
dynamic product of human interaction? And why is the comparative 
moment static rather than dynamic, aimed at facilitating the 
comparison of how even apparently unchanging formal legal 
artefacts and regimes evolve through time?  
 
There is one other point we wish to make in the course 
Synopsis and Rationale.  By setting out in parallel our separate 
intellectual journeys that led us to this course, we mean to illustrate 
for students that thinking about implicit comparative law also 
means thinking about the various reasons that have brought 
everyone together in the seminar.  In a critical legal pluralist 
framework, the enterprise of comparative law requires attention to 
recognizing and comparing the different motivations and 
understandings of law held by seminar participants. 
 
B. Course Objectives 
  
We have designed this course with two foundational learning 
objectives in mind. These objectives flow from our rationale for 
creating the course as set out above. Both are directed to enriching 
your understanding of the forms of legal normativity and of the 
distinctive character of legal normativity by contrast with social 
normativity. 
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First, by the end of the course, we hope that you will have 
acquired a more sophisticated understanding of legal normativity: 
law’s rules, institutions, processes, and methods.   
 
Even though this is not a conventional course in legal theory, 
achieving this first goal will require you to revisit some of the 
assumptions that underpin standard doctrinal approaches to the 
study of law.  In particular, we ask you to challenge the assumption 
that the concept of legal normativity can be exhausted by reference 
to explicit, formal and consciously elaborated phenomena identified 
as belonging to a particular legal regime by an ex ante rule of 
recognition. 
 
To aid this questioning, we present a model of normativity in 
which all the artefacts of law (norms, concepts, institutions, 
processes, methodologies) have multiple manifestations that can be 
plotted as coordinate points in a matrix formed by the intersection of 
two axes. The vertical axis plots degrees of conscious, institutional 
elaboration, spanning the explicit (official, conscious, chirographic) at 
the top to the implicit (interactional, unconscious, unwritten) at the 
bottom.  The horizontal axis plots the extent to which the character of 
display and articulation of legal artefacts is canonical. This axis 
spans the formulaic (discursive, stipulative, detailed) on the left to the 
inferential (presentational, open-ended, more abstract) on the right. 
 
The intersection of these two axes creates four quadrants.  
Consider how different kinds of legal rules and basic institutions, to 
take only two kinds of legal phenomena, can be plotted in these 
quadrants.  In the upper left quadrant (explicit, formulaic) are the 
most recognizable or manifest kinds of legal rules (state-enacted 
legislation and regulations), and law making institutions 
(legislatures, courts, agencies, officials).  In the upper right hand 
quadrant (explicit, inferential) are what might be called allusive legal 
phenomena. Here, we find rules announced in judicial precedents 
(ratio decidendi), and institutions that produce or interpret rules 
without themselves being designed for that purpose.  In the bottom 
left quadrant (implicit, formulaic) are what we call routine legal 
phenomena, which include customary practices and informal 
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business codes, as well as informal voluntary associations like 
standards associations and mediation services that make rules or 
apply them in settling disputes.  Finally, in the bottom right quadrant 
(implicit, inferential) are latent legal phenomena, which include 
unwritten general principles of law, personal experience, and 
relationships based on trust. 
 
The point of this complexification of normativity is, on the one 
hand, to enable you to see how much of the normative character of 
even official law is not “made” by official state institutions; and on 
the other hand, it is to assist you in recognizing how much law arises 
in everyday human interaction. Armed with such insights you may 
then begin to consider why both official and unofficial implicit 
normative phenomena must also be accounted for in any comparative 
legal exercise. 
  
Second, by the end of this seminar, we hope you will have 
developed a more intentional and sophisticated understanding of 
what counts as law and what can reasonably be called a legal 
regime (or normative order).  
 
To achieve this goal, you will have to reconsider what criteria 
you have adopted for distinguishing law from other types of 
normativity.  We want you to ask: is it useful to quest for a sharp ex 
ante criterion to identify whether any given normative system or 
regime is a legal order? And, more particularly, if it were in fact 
possible to postulate some type of differentiating criterion, would this 
criterion relate the idea of law exclusively to the artefacts of the 
political state?  
 
Traditionally, comparative law scholarship has taken as its 
primary object of study either the law of particular states or a genus 
of legal tradition (the civil law, the common law) that the law of these 
states instantiates. This tendency reveals comparativists’ 
commitment to a formalist conception of law. Instead of finding the 
epistemological and ontological heterodoxy of contemporary legal 
theory reflected in different strands of comparative law discourse, we 
find a single ideology: state legal positivism.  Several features 
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characterize this perspective: there is a single legal order operative in 
a given geographical space at any one time; this legal order is the 
normative order authorized by the state; only rules that are made or 
recognized by official institutions such as legislatures and courts 
count as law. 
 
As a result, the meta-framework of traditional comparative 
law is constructed on a notion of law as exogenous to, and imposed 
by the state upon, the individual.  This commitment shapes scholarly 
choices about what constitutes an appropriate subject of comparative 
legal study: national institutional responses to human rights 
disputes, but not competing accounts of individual understandings of 
dignity; domestic same-sex marriage laws, but not the lived 
experience of competing familial relational rules; access to small 
claims courts and official mediators and arbitrators, but not access 
to everyday informal mechanisms of dispute creation, avoidance, 
and resolution. 
 
In this course, we ask you to question the purchase of state-
centricity on the Canadian legal psyche – whether in Quebec or any 
other province, but not of course, in Nunavut.16  The legal pluralist 
hypothesis that grounds this course is meant to facilitate your 
interrogation.  This pluralist hypothesis signals four ideas: (1) In any 
given environment, several legal orders are in direct competition for 
authority; (2) None of these legal orders derives its legitimacy from 
another legal order; (3) In any given environment, the state legal order 
is not necessarily the most powerful; and (4) The movement of legal 
rules and concepts between legal orders (including the state legal 
order) is bi-directional: sometimes, the rules of the state legal order 
                                                 
16.  Alone among political jurisdictions in Canada, Nunavut does not have an 
underlying general law reflecting either the common law or the civil law 
tradition.  Indeed, because of the disparate groups found in the territory 
of Nunavut, it is difficult to claim that there is even a single underlying 
general law (ius commune).  To the extent they consider the question, 
citizens of Nunavut would not, therefore, see the enactments of the 
Canadian Parliament or the Territorial Legislature as comprising the 
paradigm case of law. 
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penetrate into non-state legal systems; and sometimes the rules of 
non-state legal orders are imported into state legal systems. 
 
In adopting a legal pluralist understanding of law as a starting 
premise for comparative inquiry, we legitimize the comparison of 
phenomena located in the allusive, customary and latent or tacit 
quadrants of the matrix noted previously. As a consequence, we are 
permitted, indeed, encouraged, to compare the interactional law of 
everyday life in multiple settings, across transient and evanescent 
micro-legal orders, as well as less transient, macro-normative orders, 
including even formalized supra-state legal orders (the law of the 
International Court of Justice and the law of the International 
Chamber of Commerce) and transnational non-state legal orders such 
as those internal to multinational corporations (the law of Toyota and 
Ford, of United Fruit and DelMonte, of Reebok and Nike), and 
religions (the Roman Catholic Church and the Eastern Orthodox 
Church). 
 
The two first-order objectives of this course are meant to 
provide the foundation for the particular vision of comparative law 
that will be pursued in our examination of sites and modes of legal 
ordering.  An expansive and pluralist account of what counts as law 
will enable you to see how comparative methodology can be deployed 
to juxtapose both manifest and latent legal artefacts and to 
understand the interaction of both official and unofficial legal orders. 
 
***** 
 
Commentary: 
 
The Course Objectives section of a syllabus should establish 
the inquiries through the pursuit of which a course moves forward. 
Accordingly, under the heading Course Objectives, we sought to 
answer the questions: What are the foundational premises of the 
course? And how are these premises elaborated in the organization 
of the course?  
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Our first intended outcome for this course is to equip 
students with a framework for enlarging their comparative law 
analyses beyond a preoccupation with formal and explicit 
phenomena.  Achieving this objective presupposes that students 
come to master a richer understanding of normativity in law 
generally. Traditional comparative law scholarship has two 
methodological foci: normative artefacts that are written (be these 
in the form of legislative enactments, regulations, or judicial 
decisions) and doctrinal analyses of these artefacts (whether 
measured by textual analysis of language or empirical studies of 
effectivity). Admittedly, many scholars who adopt these foci 
nonetheless acknowledge normative diversity. But when doing so, 
they usually tether the unofficial phenomena of which they take 
account to official law upon which the unofficial law is deemed 
parasitic.  
 
Consider the following as an example of the comparative 
inquiry that would be engaged were we to adopt an enlarged 
conception of legal phenomena. We, the co-instructors of the 
proposed course (and co-authors of this paper), are a 64-year old 
male law professor and a 32-year old female doctoral candidate, 
both members of McGill University’s Faculty of Law.  Our everyday 
interaction is formally structured by the fact that the former is the 
latter’s doctoral supervisor.   
 
But is the formalized supervisory relationship set out by the 
rules of the Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies Office at McGill the 
only, or even the central, normative regime that governs our 
interaction?  Imagine that we were writing an article comparing the 
supervisor-supervisee relationship in different countries, in 
different universities or in different departments of the same 
university.  What elements of our relationship would we consider 
central to the analysis and what normative regimes would we hold 
to be significant?17 If we recall the four-cell matrix of normativity 
                                                 
17.  See Desmond MANDERSON, « Asking Better Questions: Approaching the 
Process of Thesis Supervision », (1996) 46 J. Legal Educ. 407. 
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outlined in the syllabus, we can compile a preliminary list of the 
applicable legal regimes:  
 
(1) A number of manifest legal orders: the applicable 
legislative enactments of the governing bodies of Canada (the 
Criminal Code), Quebec (the Charte des droits et libertés de la 
personne), Montreal (City of Montreal By-Law 95-039, A By-law 
Concerning the Development of the McGill University Campus and 
Authorizing the Construction and Occupancy of a Building for the 
Faculty of Engineering), McGill University (Code of Student 
Conduct, employment regulations) and any applicable conventions 
and laws of the international legal order; 
 
(2) Multiple allusive legal orders: a potential collection of 
judgments of a mutually-acceptable third-party dispute-resolution 
authority (whether mandated by McGill or agreed to by us); the 
manuals, handbooks and other documents prepared by 
professional associations and student groups that provide advice 
about the supervisory relationship; 
 
(3) A plethora of routine legal orders: the customs, derived 
from university codes, social and professional negotiations and 
practices, and norms set out by the document that we have signed 
to regulate our relationship; in addition there are numerous 
secondary relationships arising in other dimensions of the 
interaction between us – our relationship as co-authors of scholarly 
work; the collateral relationship of referee and referent; and our 
projected relationship as co-teachers of a graduate seminar; and 
 
(4) The powerful latent legal orders that sustain the other 
types of normative orders just reviewed: culturally-understood, but 
uncodified and often unconscious, normative orders arising from 
sites of identity (we share global, national, provincial and municipal 
citizenship, socio-economic band-width, and Western-European 
heritage); sites of culturally and socially-laden differences (we differ 
according to gender, age and social and professional status); and 
the evolving set of personal understandings that arise over time 
through everyday interaction (for example, the reputation we each 
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bring to the relationship at its outset; the student’s maturing 
scholarly judgment; the supervisor’s growing acknowledgement of 
the increasing mutuality of intellectual contributions to joint 
projects).18 
 
Contemporary conceptions of comparative law typically do 
not accommodate the uncertainty and movement of norms that are 
at stake in and between the varieties of normative orders described 
above. This remains true even though comparative law scholarship 
has shown increasing concern with the interaction of norms and 
their migration across borders (political, economic, social and 
ideological), systems (of whatever level of abstraction) and traditions 
(whether self-conscious or articulated by comparative scholars).19 
In contrast, recognizing and engaging with diversity in every mode 
and site where one finds legal phenomena is a hallmark of the 
implicit comparative law approach.  Unlike the traditional focus on 
the upper quadrants (and especially on the upper left quadrant) of 
the matrix, an implicit comparative law approach recognizes the 
                                                 
18.  Our relationships with third parties add another layer of normative 
complexity to the analysis.  We each have an independent professional 
relationship with one of McGill’s Associate Deans; we have independent 
but mutual relationships with some other McGill Law faculty members, as 
well as with some of the supervisor’s current and former students; we are 
in a tri-part relationship with the institutions to which the supervisor 
wrote letters of reference on the supervisee’s behalf, McGill University as 
an institution, and the Faculty of Law. For further elaboration of the four-
cell matrix, see the sources and diagrams cited in the Annotated 
Bibliography. 
19.  For a discussion of internormativity, transplants and harmonization as 
conceptions of norm migration, see Roderick A. MACDONALD, « Les vieilles 
gardes : hypothèses sur l’émergence des normes, l’internormativité et le 
désordre à travers une typologie des institutions normatives » in Jean-Guy 
BELLEY (ed.), Le droit soluble: Contributions québécoises à l’étude de 
l’internormativité, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1996, p. 233 and Roderick A. 
MACDONALD, « Three Metaphors of Norm Migration in International 
Context », (2009) 34 Brooklyn J. of Int’l L. 603.  For a discussion of the 
appropriateness (of lack thereof) of invoking certain metaphors to describe 
the movement of norms, see: H. Patrick. GLENN, « On the Use of Biological 
Metaphors in Law: The Case of Legal Transplants », (2006) Journal of 
Comparative Law 358.  
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comparative possibilities of commensurable units regardless of 
their coordinates.  
 
Our second first-order objective for this course is that 
students will challenge the notions that authorization by the 
political state is the criterion for distinguishing legal and social 
normativity and that a state-centric framework is inevitable in legal 
study.  While the comparative enterprise’s preoccupation with legal 
phenomena emanating from the political state is not unexpected 
given some of the objectives attributed to comparative law,20 some 
comparative law scholars struggle with the constraints of 
traditional methods and categories. These analytic discomforts – 
and their prescriptions for relief – often germinate within the 
domain of comparative law and grow outwards.  As a result, both 
the diagnoses of, and the prescribed remedies for, comparative law’s 
pathologies are framed in traditional terms.  That said, alternative 
sources of relief from the malaise of orthodoxy have emerged from 
                                                 
20.  That is, if the objective is, for instance, to respond to the demands of cross-
border legal practice and the boom of international business transactions, 
then the comparative exercise can be conducted at an initial stage by 
exclusive reference to the institutions, processes, norms and practices of 
the state.  See Roderick A. MACDONALD, « Transnational Secured 
Transactions Reform », (2009) Zeitschrift fur Europaisches Privatrecht 745.  
In such cases, the value of the comparative exercise is measured in terms 
of market expansion, globalized career opportunities and consumer 
demand. Correspondence between the purpose and method of comparative 
law also exists (in a self-fulfilling way) if the goal is to classify legal systems 
into families or traditions on the basis of official, institutional responses 
to certain problems, to assist judges in filling gaps in the law or to achieve 
legislative unification, harmonization and/or reformation. On this view, 
competing non-state normative orders can be discounted as secondary, as 
parasitic upon the state legal order, and as evidencing mere states of fact 
illustrating the inevitable difference between “legal cultures”. For further 
discussion of these themes, see R. A. MACDONALD, « Is Law a Zoo? », supra, 
note 2.  See also, for an example of measuring the “unofficial” against the 
“official”, in this case, informal economies against the gross domestic 
product, see Friedrich SCHNEIDER, Andreas BUEHN, and Claudio E. 
MONTENEGRO, « Shadow Economies All over the World – New Estimates for 
162 Countries from 1999 to 2007 », (2010) Policy Research Working Papers 
5356, online: <http://elibrary.worldbank.org> (page consulted on July 25, 
2013). 
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studies of structural connections between instantiations of micro-
legal orders (the law of everyday life) and macro-legal orders.21  Such 
exercises, which adopt legal pluralist premises and work inwards 
towards comparative law, offer insight into the mechanisms of 
situating official and unofficial law in each other’s comparative gaze. 
 
Our proposed course, however, goes beyond simply 
comparing non-official micro- and macro-legal orders with official 
state law.  Course participants will step both analytical feet outside 
the realm of official law and into a domain that accepts non-official 
law as legitimate on its own terrain.  Pursuant to this approach, 
neither the state nor official agencies of law-making or law-
interpretation are required to provide an institutional locus for 
distinguishing real law from other forms of normativity. While many 
legal pluralists adopt a social scientific conception (which seeks to 
find in actual normative orders the equivalent institutions, rules 
and practices of state law), others (including the authors of this 
paper) take a conception of law in which a legal order is constituted 
(that is, legitimated as law) not by any institutional claim it makes 
of legal subjects, but by the legitimacy that leg al subjects accord to 
that legal order and its claims.22 The pluralist perspective 
                                                 
21.  Daniel JUTRAS, « The Legal Dimensions of Everyday Life », (2001) 16 
C.J.L.S. 65 (which identifies the “architectural continuity” between brief 
encounters and formal, institutionalized human interaction, as manifested 
in shared tensions and polarities across the normative orders and along 
the axes of (1) the interdependence of norms and power and (2) the 
operation of explicit and implicit normativity).  See also Lon L. FULLER, 
« The Law’s Precarious Hold on Life », (1968-1969) 3 Ga. L. Rev. 530; W. 
Michael REISMAN, Law in Brief Encounters, New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1999 (which uses official law as a means of illuminating the 
characteristics of everyday life as an interactive legally-ordered space); 
Roderick A. MACDONALD, Lessons of Everyday Law, Montreal, McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2002 (which invokes the allegorical potential of 
everyday life to illuminate fundamental problems of macrolegal ordering).  
Consider also Justice Albie SACHS, The Strange Alchemy of Life and Law, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009. 
22.   This is not to say that there is no criterion by which to assess these claims. 
But, the processes of characterization and assessment are, foremost, 
matters of personal judgment and the criteria relied on, whatever they 
might be – neutrality, coherence, justice, predictability, liberty – are 
reflections of the legal agent.  For a discussion of criteria for distinguishing 
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underlying this course embodies an understanding that law is 
present wherever people are engaged in symbolizing human 
conduct (both their own and that of others) as governed by rules. 
This they do whenever they reflect on the relative weight they afford 
to competing normative claims, whatever the source or type. 
 
C. Specific Learning Outcomes 
 
We aim to build on the course rationale and the first-order 
objectives set out above by attaching two specific learning (or second-
order) aims to the substance and pedagogy of this course and striving 
to assist each of you in your pursuit and attainment of these goals.  
We hope that through the course tuition, you will encounter questions, 
resources, and methodologies that will empower you to transform the 
course into an intellectual endeavour that is meaningful for you and 
your colleagues.  The second-order objectives that we identify here 
are primarily concerned with encouraging you to confront your own 
position in relation to the more complex conceptions of law and legal 
normativity described above.  In other words, we ask you to 
interrogate your understanding of your own legal identity and 
agency, as well as the legal identity and agency of each participant 
in this course.  We will pursue these outcomes collectively, but their 
ultimate attainment will attach at the individual level.  
 
Our first second-order objective is that, by the end of the 
course, you will have cultivated a more complex understanding of 
your own position in relation to conceptions of law.  
 
                                                 
legal and social norms and normative orders, see Roderick A. MACDONALD, 
« Triangulating Social Law Reform », in Y. GENDREAU (ed.), Dessiner la 
société par le droit, Montreal, Éditions Thémis, 2004, p. 119. Further, a 
legal agent may find authority by virtue of the wisdom of others: “The 
manifestly foolish human being, interacting with others, is a law-maker 
and a law-applier, but no one accepts her or his actions as authoritative; 
by contrast, the wise human being, engaged in the same activities, can be 
taken to be an authority, and other human beings – even as agents – will 
defer to her or his understandings”: Roderick A. MACDONALD, « Custom 
Made – For a Non-chirographic Critical Legal Pluralism », (2011) 26 C.J.L.S. 
301, note 32.  
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To achieve this goal, we want you to interrogate your usual 
position as external to law: Are you a legal subject constituted by 
law, or are you a law-creating legal agent?  To facilitate this 
endeavour, we adopt a critical legal pluralist hypothesis – and the 
agent-centred conception of law at its heart – as a premise of this 
course. According to a critical legal pluralist account, the “legal 
subject” posits the self as the irreducible site of normativity and 
internormativity and understands that all human individuals are, in 
their social interaction, law-makers and law-appliers. Put otherwise, 
your primary concern in this course will not be with how law 
(especially official law) treats you.  Rather, your focus will be the 
ways in which you apprehend, constitute, remake and deny law or – 
in other words – how you treat law. 
 
Such an orientation immediately requires you to confront all 
those types of law that are not explicitly made. These can be grouped 
under the idea of “tacit” or “implicit” law. This idea does not just refer 
to the unwritten rules of the official legal order that sustain and 
nourish the state’s legislative and judicial processes or the un-
enacted general principles, customs, and usages that may be 
recognized by national and sub-national courts.  While these 
understandings correctly conceive of implicit law as arising in human 
interaction, they incorrectly presume that interaction generates 
implicit law exclusively vis-a-vis its ties to the existing explicit legal 
order.   
 
Traditional models of comparative law do not account for the 
full dimensions of implicit law; the model of implicit comparative law 
presented in this course does.  To engage in an implicit comparative 
law analysis is to reject the orthodox assumption that the artefacts 
of official law are the exclusive units of comparative concern, accept 
that the comparative mediator is the individual legal agent (i.e. the 
individual who makes, applies and lives the law and who navigates 
and recounts the interaction of normative orders), and embrace the 
implicit law reflected in the normativity emergent in the reciprocal 
adjustment of expectations that legal agents have of each other. 
Accordingly, implicit law, and the interaction that generates it, may 
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unfold and exist independently of any acknowledgement, approval 
or authorization of an official legal institution. 
 
The second specific learning outcome rests on our cardinal 
intention that this course be self-reflexive.  You are meant to apply the 
protocols of the implicit comparative law approach to your own 
understanding of how all your other legal activities are pursued.  The 
syllabus you have in front of you is, at best, the equivalent of explicit 
and formulaic normativity – the normative hypothesis of a law-maker 
(in this instance, the course instructors).  Accordingly, each of you is 
encouraged to develop your own individualized syllabus for the 
course, making use of the entire range of explicit and implicit normative 
resources that we canvass during the academic term. Moreover, to 
maximize the reflexivity of this transformation process, you should 
strive to interact with all the course participants as they undertake the 
same exercise.  
 
At bottom, the personal learning syllabus that each of you 
creates for yourself is the most important outcome to which the course 
aspires. The ambition is that you will extend the comparative exercise 
to the enterprise of learning, by considering how you and your 
classmates have come to understand the diverse possibilities, as well 
as the potential limits, of learning law that are opened up by the 
implicit comparative law hypothesis. After all, if that hypothesis is 
valid, every participant in this course is at one and the same time, a 
teacher and a learner.  Throughout the semester we will constantly be 
asking ourselves whether we are making the most of our own 
learning/teaching experience. 
 
***** 
 
Commentary: 
 
The specific learning outcomes set out in a syllabus are 
statements of aspiration.  Our stated outcomes are attempts to 
answer the questions: What skills and knowledge bases do we hope 
that students will develop in this course? What personal journey do 
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we hope that the course participants will embark on during the course 
and take with them beyond the classroom? 
 
Our first second-order objective for this course is that 
students will interrogate their usual submissive, external place vis-
à-vis law.  Hence, our explicit commitment to a critical legal 
pluralist approach. Indeed, this course rests on the claim that a 
critical legal pluralist hypothesis is at once, the foundation of 
implicit comparative law and the necessary outcome of implicit 
comparative law in action.  
 
Consider first the foundational premise, which is illuminated 
by articulating propositions central to the critical legal pluralist 
hypothesis. First, for a critical legal pluralist, the individual – the 
legal subject and legal agent – is the locus of normative 
interaction.23  Second, the analytical focus is on contingency, 
agency and pervasive heterogeneity in individuals’ imagination and 
engagement with multiple applicable legal orders24 and these 
                                                 
23.  “A radical legal pluralism [for the purposes of this text, this phrase should 
read “a critical legal pluralist approach”] presumes that legal subjects hold 
each of their multiple narrating selves up to the scrutiny of each of their 
other narrating selves, and up to the scrutiny of all the other narrated 
selves projected upon them by others.  In doing so, we acknowledge that 
our multiple selves are constituted by these multiple reciprocal gazes, and 
that because they have the potential to multiply themselves through each 
reciprocal gaze, the number of possible selves is limitless: it grows 
exponentially at, and with, each gaze.  In brief, particular legal subjects 
are constituted, shaped, remade, denied and destroyed through the 
knowledge and identities they inherit, create and share with other legal 
subjects”: Roderick A. MACDONALD, « Here, There… and Everywhere: 
Theorizing Legal Pluralism; Theorizing Jacques Vanderlinden », in Lynne 
CASTONGUAY et Nicholas KASIRER (ed.), Étudier et enseigner le droit: hier, 
aujourd’hui et demain – Études offertes à Jacques Vanderlinden, Montreal, 
Éditions Yvon Blais, 2006, p. 412-413. 
24.  Critical legal pluralism embodies heterogeneity (plurality embraces 
complexity not only numericality); flux (power distribution dynamics are 
central to tracing trajectories of normative interaction); and dissonance 
(systemic coherence is problematic within any given spatial, temporal, 
social or affective fields). See Roderick A. MACDONALD, « Critical legal 
Pluralism as a Construction of Normativity and the Emergence of Law », in 
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constructive endeavors take place every day in numerous sites and 
through numerous practices. Finally, the multiple normative 
outputs negotiated in these constructive endeavours are more than 
social practices – they are the reflection of discrete, yet 
interpenetrated, legal regimes.  Put another way, these propositions 
of the critical legal pluralist approach provide that both law’s 
creation and the processes of internormativity require legal agents 
to engage in, and understand the legal enterprise as, a taxonomic 
and comparative negotiation of the myriad explicit and implicit legal 
orders at play in any particular interaction.  
 
Now consider the action premise.  A critical legal pluralist 
approach does not describe given entities in the world. Rather, it 
acts as a heuristic device for analyzing patterns of social and 
normative interaction; identifying contingent relationships between 
norms, methods of ordering, modes of symbolizing and specific 
social milieu; analyzing normative continuity and change over time 
and space; describing differing intensities of normative interaction 
among various actors; and modeling mutual adjustment among 
legal orders. On this model, the most basic inquiries are obviously 
not concerned with how law interacts with society, but rather with 
how different legal normativities within society interact. Moreover, 
by positing that normative argument not be short-circuited by 
claims of systemic priority, this critical legal pluralist approach 
exposes the contingency of normative concepts operative within 
given regimes and requires the development of modes of argument 
and reasoning that recognize plural sources of normativity. 
 
Taking the foundational and action premises seriously 
entails understanding that the interaction between different legal 
regimes cannot be exhausted simply by comparing when, how and 
why one legal order officially adopts – or should adopt – the norms 
of another.  Normative conflict, migration and transplantation 
originate not in overlapping or parallel explicit orders, but rather in 
the everyday experience of the legal agent.  The inquiry starts by 
                                                 
Andrée LAJOIE et al. (eds.), Théories et émergence du droit: pluralisme, 
surdétermination et effectivité, Montréal, Éditions Thémis, 1998, p. 20.   
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accepting that examining diverse instances of internormativity is to 
take seriously, for each site of legal production, the conceptual 
apparatus inherent in it.  It is to presuppose that individuals 
themselves (be they officials or not) set the conditions under which 
they undertake inter-normative dialogue.  In this exercise, each 
legal regime will be understood both as subject – having its own 
conception of ‘sources of law’ and criteria of jurisdictional porosity 
– and as object – subject to incorporation into another legal order, 
notwithstanding its own self-conception, on terms established by 
that other order. 
 
The second specific learning outcome that we have set for 
this course focuses on the reflexivity of teaching, learning and 
ultimately, of law.  It signals our aim to amplify the intentionality of 
comparative legal study and to enlarge and optimize both the 
aspirational and the practical aims of the endeavour. Our ambition 
to attain these aims is grounded in two articles of faith.  First, we 
believe that each course participant – student, instructor – will, as 
the semester proceeds, create his or her own course.  That is, the 
formal course tuition as reflected in the syllabus is only a part of 
the comparative endeavour that each student will undertake.  
Through the various exercises and assignments, in combination 
with the divergent constellation of normative commitments that 
each one brings to the seminar, students will construct a course 
that is unique to them.  The seminar will become, therefore, for each 
student, his or her own site of law.   
 
The complementary belief driving our commitment to 
reflexivity is that, in developing these individual courses, every 
student in the course will interact with every other student.  We 
believe that the richest form of comparative learning involves 
assessing one’s own actions and assumptions in the light of the 
actions and assumptions of others.  At bottom, the implicit 
comparative law hypothesis is that the greater the number of sites of 
comparison in any learning environment, the deeper the 
understanding not just of law, but of comparative law.  And the sites 
of comparison can never be fully stipulated in advance; each new site 
being explored opens a previously unknown range of other potential 
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sites.  This is the tacit dimension of knowledge that is signalled by 
the notion “implicit comparative law”.25 
 
D. Primary Reference Materials 
 
We have compiled the obligatory materials for this course into 
a compendium of, first, written and graphic works and, second, 
instructions for accessing non-textual and non-still (e.g. video, 
musical, theatrical, and multi-media) works. The compendium can be 
downloaded from the course website or photocopied from our master 
version, which we will bring to class.    
 
You may wish to complement or supplement the works 
provided for in the compendium by accessing reference materials that 
mine the primary themes of this course to their epistemic and 
conceptual bases.  Below, we list primary reference works in four 
expansive categories that lie at the core of our configuration of this 
course – (1) the foundations of comparative law, (2) transsystemia, 
(3) legal pluralism and (4) implicit law. Each of the reference materials 
listed below is available either on the course website (articles) or at 
the reserve desk in the Law Library (texts).  Additional routes for 
exploring these (and related) areas of inquiry are mapped in the 
Annotated Bibliography (Appendix). 
 
(1) Our study of the traditional North American and 
Western European approach to comparative law compels us to 
confront the “masters” of the field.  The classical literature is rich and 
voluminous. You could begin an instructive foray into the field by 
familiarizing yourself with the form, substance, and evolution of the 
following authoritative texts:    
 
                                                 
25.  For a discussion of the epistemic assumptions of the tacit dimension of 
knowledge – that is, the knowns and unknowns underlying individual 
knowledge – at stake in implicit comparative law see Michael POLANYI, 
Personal Knowledge, New York, Harper Torchbacks, 1956 and Michael 
POLANYI, The Tacit Dimension, Garden City, Doubleday, 1966. 
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Arthur VON MEHREN and James R. GORDLEY, The Civil 
Law System: An Introduction to the Comparative 
Study of Law, 2nd ed., Boston, Little Brown & Co., 1977. 
 
Konrad ZWEIGERT and Hein KOTZ, An Introduction to 
Comparative Law, 3rd ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1998. 
 
René DAVID et Camille JAUFFRET-SPINOSI, Les grands 
systèmes de droit contemporains, 11e éd., Paris, 
Dalloz, 2002. 
 
H. Patrick GLENN, Legal Traditions of the World: 
Sustainable Diversity in Law, 4th ed., New York, Oxford 
University Press, 2010. 
 
A rich compilation of recent, varied perspectives on the 
development of comparative law in certain regions of the world, on 
approaches to comparative law as an intellectual endeavour, and on 
the state of comparative studies in particular areas of law is found 
in: 
 
Mathias REIMANN and Reinhard ZIMMERMAN (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2008. 
 
Moreover, the tuition in this course is premised on a concern 
with the individual legal subject’s centrality to comparative legal 
knowledge, processes and practices.  For helpful development of this 
theme, see:  
 
Roderick A. MACDONALD, «Custom Made – For a Non-
chirographic Critical Legal Pluralism» (2011) 26 C.J.L.S. 
301. 
 
2) The McGill Faculty of Law’s transsystemic curriculum 
is the culmination of evolving institutional commitments to an 
ongoing, open conversation with law over time.  Transsystemia is 
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neither uniform in concept nor static in execution.  Nevertheless, its 
current instantiation at McGill reflects a curricular theory and practice 
that offers much insight into the ambition and actualization of implicit 
comparative law. If you are looking for discussions that foreground 
the McGill Programme’s evolution and methodological approach, the 
following sources will be of assistance: 
 
Roderick A. MACDONALD, « The National Law 
Programme at McGill: Origins, Establishment, 
Prospects », (1990) 13 Dal. L.J. 211. 
 
Yves-Marie MORISSETTE, « McGill’s Integrated Civil and 
Common Law Program », (2002) 52 J. Legal Educ. 12. 
 
Nicholas KASIRER, « Bijuralism in Law’s Empire and in 
Law’s Cosmos », (2002) 52 J. Legal Educ. 29. 
 
Alternatively, for accounts of transsystemic pedagogy and the 
experience of a transsystemic classroom, look to these two articles:  
 
Roderick A. MACDONALD and Jason MACLEAN, « No 
Toilets in Park », (2005) 50 McGill L.J. 721. 
 
Jacques P. VANDERLINDEN, « Une lecture du système 
normatif de l’Église catholique par un pluraliste 
comparatiste aux personnalités multiples », (2005) 50 
McGill L.J. 809. 
 
Finally, if you are seeking help in constructing a framework 
for assessing the McGill Programme’s successes and failures, its 
versatility and singularity, the following two articles will provide you 
with some starting points: 
 
Harry ARTHURS, « Madly off in One Direction: McGill’s 
New Integrated, Polyjural, Transsystemic Law 
Programme », (2005) 50 McGill L.J. 707. 
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Peter L. STRAUSS, « Transsystemia – Are We 
Approaching a New Langdellian Moment? Is McGill 
Leading the Way? », (2006) 56 J. Legal Educ. 161. 
 
(3) “Legal pluralism” signifies a range of hypotheses about 
law that point to non-monist accounts of the forms, sites, modes, 
meanings and/or trajectories of law. The critical legal pluralist 
approach that underlies this course is a response to the dominant 
narratives of contemporary pluralist legal scholarship.  One of the 
instructors of this course has elaborated on the foundational 
principles of critical legal pluralism and its position vis-à-vis other 
strands of legal pluralist thought in an extensive scholarly corpus.  
The principal accounts are found in:  
 
Martha-Marie KLEINHANS and Roderick A. MACDONALD, 
« What is a Critical Legal Pluralism? », (1997) 12 
C.J.L.S. 25. 
 
Roderick A. MACDONALD, « Critical legal Pluralism as a 
Construction of Normativity and the Emergence of Law » 
in Andrée LAJOIE et al. (eds.), Théories et émergence du 
droit: pluralisme, surdétermination et effectivité, 
Montréal, Éditions Thémis, 1998, p. 9. 
 
Roderick A. MACDONALD and David SANDOMIERSKI, 
« Against Nomopolies », (2006) 57 Northern Ireland 
Legal Quarterly 610. 
 
Roderick A. MACDONALD, « Here, There… and 
Everywhere: Theorizing Legal Pluralism; Theorizing 
Jacques Vanderlinden » in Nicholas KASIRER (ed.), 
Étudier et enseigner le droit: hier, aujourd’hui et 
demain – Études offertes à Jacques Vanderlinden, 
Montreal, Éditions Yvon Blais, 2006, p. 381. 
 
(4) The concept of "implicit law" is not new or unique to this 
course. A number of scholars have undertaken the task of exploring 
its foundations and considering the relationship between implicit 
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forms of normativity and official legal institutions.  The following 
sources are especially helpful in this regard:  
 
Lon L. FULLER, Anatomy of Law, New York, Frederick A 
Praeger, 1968.  
 
Lon L. FULLER, « Human Interaction and the Law », 
(1969) 14 Am. J. of Juris. 3. 
 
Gerald POSTEMA, « Implicit Law » in Willem J. WITTEVEEN 
and Wibren VAN DER BURG (eds.), Rediscovering Fuller: 
Essays on Implicit Law and Institutional Design, 
Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 1999, p. 
255.  
 
Jeremy WEBBER, « Legal Pluralism and Human 
Agency », (2006) 44-1 Osgoode Hall L.J. 167.  
 
Roderick A. MACDONALD, « Unitary Law Re-form, 
Pluralistic Law Re-Substance: Illuminating Social 
Change », (2007) 67 La. L. Rev. 1113.   
 
Kristen RUNDLE, Forms Liberate, London, Hart 
Publishing, 2012. 
 
***** 
 
Commentary: 
 
In the design of a course, considerable effort must be devoted 
to developing a set of obligatory course materials, as well as a list of 
complementary readings.  Our criteria for selecting obligatory 
materials are closely tied to our course objectives.  Obligatory 
materials are not simply a portable library of substantive texts that 
cover the topics of each class session.  They must also speak to all 
course objectives, including pedagogical goals, and the set of skills 
(oral and written communication, institutional design and 
instrument choice, integration and transformation of material, the 
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recognition and resolution of ethical dilemmas) that are inherent in 
all deep learning.  This is why the use of websites, other external 
linkages, and materials in non-written and fluid forms is a 
necessary feature of our implicit comparative law course.  To date, 
few doctrinal writings present the problems of implicit law and we 
have found none that address our concern with implicit 
comparative law. Most of our compulsory sources, consequently, 
are drawn from everyday human experience and do not show up in 
any indexes of law or comparative law. 
 
The complementary references listed in this section have 
another purpose. Here the goal is to provide students with 
references to some foundational writings about key course themes. 
We have purposely selected materials that take provocative 
positions and that have extensive bibliographies. We have sought to 
select materials that instantiate pluralist themes and that will 
enable students to locate their own emerging understandings 
within the intellectual traditions of contemporary reflection on 
comparative law.  While some reflect our own views, other texts are 
intended to provide counterpoints.  The Annotated Bibliography in 
the Appendix provides a further resource of this type.  Our 
assumption is that course participants will have an occasion, in 
reading these further sources, to apply research and analytical 
protocols addressed in the seminar to evaluate the assumptions 
that authors make, and to hone their critical capacity to ferret out 
the implicit dimensions of the comparative exercise that these 
authors are undertaking.26  Moreover, we conceive of these 
materials as complementary to signal that each member of the 
seminar is expected to actively seize the role of agent in the 
individual intellectual journey and comparative practice on which 
he or she has embarked and of which this course is a part. 
 
                                                 
26.  The approach to scholarship implicit in our selection of materials is 
derived from Susanne K. LANGER, Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the 
Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art, 3rd ed., Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, 1957. 
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E. Course Content and Pedagogical Approach 
 
In this course, we begin by asking comparative questions 
about comparative law. We ask you to reflect upon the mainstream 
view of comparative law and to inquire into the reasons for its 
historical monopoly of the field.  This inquiry has two dimensions.  
One is historical.  Consider whether comparative law would now be 
framed as it is if the first such endeavours were products of the late 
18th or the late 20th rather than the late 19th century.  The other is 
conceptual.  Consider whether the approach to comparative legal 
study in different parts of the world (North America, South America, 
Europe, Africa, Asia), or even in different countries (for example, 
Japan, Germany, Israel, the United States) reflects any features 
(historical, geographic, political, demographic) that may be specific to 
such regions or states.  To facilitate these tasks and to pursue their 
implications throughout this course we juxtapose mainstream views 
with our alternative approach, which we label implicit comparative 
law. The comparative endeavour announced by this title speaks not 
only to the ostensible subject matter of the course but also to its 
pedagogy.   
 
The section of this syllabus on specific learning outcomes 
indicates that the scope of the topics covered in the course and our 
pedagogical approach are grounded in a particular legal theory – 
critical legal pluralism.  What does it mean to teach and learn 
comparative law taking such an approach? The following example, 
taken from a hypothetical fact situation that we will address at length 
in our initial class, is offered as an illustration of how we will weave 
content and pedagogy together in this course. The hypothetical is 
drawn from the general universe of commercial transactions and, 
more specifically, from the field of inventory financing.  Our goal is to 
inquire into (1) the legal regimes that are intended to regulate the 
distribution and sale of snowmobiles in Rouyn, Quebec, in 
Hawkesbury, Ontario, in Geneva, Switzerland, and in Thredbo, 
Australia, and (2) the legal systems that aim to regulate the 
distribution and sale of automobiles in Montreal, Quebec, in Toronto, 
Ontario, in Paris, France and in London, England.  The course 
materials will introduce you to the official regulatory schemes in place 
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in these different political jurisdictions (Civil and Commercial Codes, 
common law cases, Personal Property Security Acts, and so on).  As 
you are reviewing these materials, you should ask yourself exactly 
how you are engaging in a comparative analysis. What are the 
normative regimes that provide the legal framework through which 
different sets (and forms) of materials may be regrouped? With 
respect to each regime, what is the genus that provides the common 
ground for comparison? And what are the criteria of differentiation 
that define the matrix onto which you might plot your comparative 
observations? 
 
In an orthodox exercise of comparative law, we would likely 
begin by identifying the legal family or tradition to which the official 
law of each of the particular cities in question belongs. Assuming that 
we are studying at a law faculty in Quebec, in such an exercise we 
would initially regroup the eight sites according to the political unit 
(Quebec, Ontario, England, France, Switzerland, and New South 
Wales) where they are located. But orthodoxy would see little interest 
in comparing sites of law in the same political jurisdiction (for 
example, Hawkesbury and Toronto, or Rouyn and Montreal).  So a 
complementary opening reflex would be to regroup these cities as 
being located in either civil law or common law jurisdictions.  Once 
this is done, a doctrinal comparison could then be organized by 
exploring the official law applicable to financing snowmobiles in, for 
example, Rouyn, Quebec, and Hawkesbury, Ontario, or more 
generally the official law of secured financing common to Rouyn and 
Montreal (and more remotely Paris and Geneva) with the official law 
common to Hawkesbury and Toronto (and more remotely London and 
Thredbo).   
 
Why, however, are these particular groupings our first 
comparative reflex?  When and why does the official law of a Civil 
Code or a Personal Property Security Act achieve pride of place in the 
way we organize different normative regimes? To answer, we need 
to examine the assumptions about law, legal knowledge, identity and 
difference, legal subjects and legal agents that ground this 
comparative exercise – assumptions that are both explicit and implicit 
in the way we have been learning the law to this point in our law 
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faculty careers.  Since we know that there can be other conceptions 
of what characterizes a normative regime, there must likewise be 
different criteria by which regimes may be grouped and compared. 
Under what criteria of similarity might we consider the primary 
cognates to be Rouyn and Hawkesbury (and more remotely Geneva 
and Thredbo) on the one hand, and Montreal and Toronto (and more 
remotely Paris and London) on the other? Here, we only need imagine 
that the foci of our comparative inquiry are the object of the 
transaction (snowmobiles or automobiles) and the character of the 
retail market for those objects. Might it also be possible that the 
primary cognates are old world cities (Paris, London and Geneva) as 
against new world cities (Toronto, Montreal, Rouyn, Hawkesbury, 
and Thredbo)? Still again, are there not conceptions of normative 
regimes in which the primary cognate pairs might even be Rouyn and 
Toronto on the one hand, and Montreal and Hawkesbury on the 
other?  Or might they be Paris and Thredbo (and more remotely 
London and Geneva) on the one hand, and Montreal and Toronto (and 
more remotely Rouyn and Hawkesbury) on the other?  For such to be 
the case we need only consider how patterns of trade, internal 
corporate distribution mechanisms, and inventory and consumer 
financing opportunities might affect trade practices and customary 
norms that develop around these practices. 
 
As you think through these hypotheses you may also wish to 
consider what impact, if any, different professorial approaches to the 
transsystemic teaching of private law at McGill may have on your 
susceptibility to notice and analyze these various normative regimes.  
Suppose that the target of transsystemic teaching in one professor’s 
course is to explore the extent to which diverse variations on the 
common law tradition (say, England, U.S., Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, India) could be mapped onto diverse variations on the civil 
law tradition (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Quebec, Brazil).  Then 
suppose that for another professor the endeavour is to consider 
whether civil and common law traditions are each just instantiations 
of a larger intellectual construction – the western idea of law – and 
that richer comparative insight could be gained by comparing these 
western traditions with the ensemble of monotheistic religious 
traditions – for example, Islamic law, Talmudic law, and Canon law.  
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Contrast both these approaches with transsystemic teaching that is 
grounded in a legal pluralist approach that privileges chthonic 
normative regimes like those instantiated by diverse aboriginal legal 
systems in Canada and the United States.  Such an exercise shows 
that adopting an implicit comparative law framework invites inquiry 
into the different ways you might compare the transsystemic 
teaching you have been experiencing in your various courses at 
McGill.  
 
As for the pedagogical approach in this course, it is important 
to signal that the legal pluralist hypothesis grounds every feature of 
the tuition.  It frames the manner in which different normative orders 
operate and interact across the range of substantive topics and 
themes – rules, concepts, procedures, institutions, methodologies, 
and approaches to teaching and learning law – we address.  It 
influences our approach to communication both in and beyond the 
classroom.  The formal languages of instruction in the course will be 
English and French, but on several occasions some other symbolic 
discourse – music, dance, art, film and mime, for example – will be 
adopted.  Course materials will be equally polyglot.  Moreover, since 
the course is meant to uncover the implicit normative orders that shape 
the legal manifold regimes operative in a given social space, our 
pedagogical practices will also vary from class to class. All sessions 
will be interactive and problem-based, using various horizontal, 
participatory formats, including role-playing, small group break-outs, 
inverted debates, jury-room processes, and talking circles.  About one-
third of the sessions will actually be led by you rather than us.   
 
***** 
 
Commentary: 
 
In the Course Content section of the syllabus, we have tried 
to show the close connection between form and substance in an 
implicit comparative law course.  The point is that the two 
questions, “What is this course about?” and “How do we teach 
implicit comparative law?” inform each other.  Most obviously, since 
the focus of the course is as much on implicit as on explicit 
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normative orders, a pedagogical approach emphasizing lectures 
that are meant simply to transmit information is unsuitable.  
Likewise, since unwritten norms and practices bulk large as objects 
of inquiry in this course, a pedagogical approach that aims only to 
compare formal institutions or contrast the written norms of 
different systems would be counter-productive. Further, being 
attentive to the assumptions of a critical legal pluralist hypothesis 
means ensuring that there is no single point of authority in the 
classroom. That is, to the extent that the course instructors alone 
take charge of each class, impose their conceptions of the subject 
and object of inquiry on other course participants, and control the 
scope of intellectual inquiry, they would be replicating in the 
classroom the monistic, top-down approach to legal norms that the 
course syllabus claims to reject. 
 
To illustrate these points it is useful to return to the 
inventory financing example set out in the syllabus.  The point here 
is that particular state legal systems and the more generic legal 
traditions they are believed to instantiate are not exhaustive of the 
comparative possibilities. In the inventory financing example, if we 
take the traditional comparative law approach comparing the 
regimes in Rouyn and Hawkesbury, we are reinforcing the orthodox 
view that the official “positive law” of the authoritative political 
regime is the primary normative system that governs commercial 
conduct among financers, wholesalers, retailers and customers.   
 
But if, adopting a critical legal pluralist approach, we look at 
other normative regimes that might regulate this commercial 
conduct, the first inquiry would be: what are the different criteria 
by which we could aggregate particular instances?  Consider what 
impact each of the following would have on our analysis of cognates 
or agnates: transaction type (financing wholesale distributions, 
financing retail sales); object of the transaction (snowmobiles, 
automobiles); overall economic structures (the economies of eastern 
North America, Europe, Australia); patterns of trade; affinities of 
corporate groups and dealerships; the types and roles of major 
lending institutions; local legal practices; the climate of labour 
relations; the possible uses of snowmobiles and automobiles; and 
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so on. Equally relevant considerations for the navigation of the 
participating subjects’ legal engagement and the competing legal 
orders governing their actions are considerations of the needs and 
wants of the parties to the transaction, the structure and status of 
their personal economies, the explanations and processes deployed 
during the negotiation process, and the mechanisms they prefer for 
dispute resolution.   
 
The implicit comparative law hypothesis that we present 
recognizes and embraces this diversity. Indeed, our methodology 
means asking, in respect of the inventory financing example, under 
what social, economic and political conditions and under what 
conceptions of law would it be plausible to consider all the possible 
permutations and combinations of the eight geographic sites to be 
the most significant cognate grouping?  This type of question, which 
we believe to be at the heart of the richest form of transsystemic 
teaching, is just the beginning.  Until one actually begins to explore 
the official law governing a particular example comparatively, the 
myriad tacit normative regimes remain occult.  As each tacit regime 
is revealed, we are in a position to assess the salience (or lack of 
salience) of the explicit criteria of comparison we may be 
presumptively adopting.  In such an endeavour, we may discover, 
for the purposes of understanding the nature of regimes of 
inventory financing, that the primary cognate pairing of sites and 
regimes is snowmobiles in Geneva, Switzerland and automobiles in 
Toronto, Ontario, or snowmobiles in Thredbo, New South Wales, 
and automobiles in Paris, France.27    
 
Of course, the example that we propose to invoke in the first 
session of our course should not be construed as suggesting that 
the implicit comparative law analysis requires, as its raw material, 
                                                 
27.  For further development of these hypotheses see Roderick A. MACDONALD 
and Isabelle DESCHAMPS, « Planimétrie et topographie en droit des sûretés » 
in Nathalie MARTIAL-BRAZ, Jean-François RIFFARD and Martine BEHAR-
TOUCHAIS (eds.), Les mutations de la norme, Paris, Economica, 2011, p. 
117; and Roderick A. MACDONALD, « A Model Law on Secured Transactions. 
A Representation of Structure? An Object of Idealized Imitation? A Type, 
Template or Design? », (2010) Uniform Law Review 419.   
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units of comparison that are tied to, defined by, or, at the limit, even 
cognizable within, a political jurisdiction.  In this initial session, we 
could easily have invoked interpersonal relationships as the 
orienting theme and drawn on the list of legal regimes governing the 
relationship between the co-authors of this paper as a source of 
comparative analysis.28 The commensurable units of all four 
quadrants of the matrix could be invoked, whether in a comparative 
analysis of the legal orders applicable to one relationship or as part 
of an inquiry into the normativity at stake in a range of 
interpersonal arrangements. The rationale for exploring this 
orienting inventory financing example is to illustrate that the design 
of any hypothetical fact situation offers an opportunity to explore 
the radically different regimes of comparison that are thrown up for 
analysis when an implicit comparative law methodology is deployed.    
 
Given the inquiries that form the substance of this course, 
the appropriate pedagogical approaches set out in the syllabus are 
intrinsically constrained.  A lecture method in which student 
interaction is minimal is not well conceived if a primary object is to 
encourage an active exploration of the tacit. The Socratic Method is 
also sub-optimal; for while a Socratic dialogue pushes students to 
revise and refine their initial responses to hypothetical problems 
posed by the instructor, there is usually little space left open for 
debating the premises that lie behind the problem chosen or the 
implicit limitations on the arguments from authority that can be 
made in support of the increasingly refined responses that are 
developed in response to instructor questioning.  By contrast, 
methods that encourage all participants in the class to contribute 
to framing and reframing a problem, and which enable them to do 
so in diverse symbolic discourses that do not necessarily rest on the 
specificity of premises we associate with the logical syllogism, will 
lead participants to conceptions of the issue under discussion that, 
until the moment of discovery, were tacit.  Finally, by requiring all 
course participants to take the lead in organizing at least one class 
                                                 
28.  See section II.B, above.   Patrick Glenn has developed a rich conception of 
the materials and objects of legal comparison that is consistent with this 
view of multiple normative orders in H. Patrick GLENN, « A Concept of Legal 
Tradition », (2008) 34 Queen’s L. J. 427. 
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session, we hope students will learn the limits of discursive 
language in opening reflection beyond the realm of explicit 
normativity.29 
 
F. Assignments and Assessment 
 
 This course attempts to integrate theoretical, methodological 
and substantive readings, resources and discussion with hands-on 
experience. The assessment scheme for the course reflects this 
objective.  Several of its features are cardinal.  First, the process will 
be continual throughout the semester.  Second, the process will be 
both informal and formal.  Third, the process will be interactive.  
Fourth, you will have a chance to tailor the evaluation process to your 
own needs and work with us in its specific design.  In this regard, 
most assignments in this course can be submitted in alternative 
linguistic formats – poetry, plays, and short stories – and in non-
textual forms of symbolic discourse – visual arts, music, drama, 
dance, mime, film – or a combination of these forms and modes. You 
may simply assume that your assignments may be submitted in any 
format that we have adopted as a mode of communication in our 
classroom teaching. 
 
You will be assessed on the basis of four sets of exercises.  
Some of these will be graded on a pass/fail scale, while others will 
be evaluated according to the Faculty’s letter-based calibration.  
Moreover, the evaluation of your assignments will sometimes be 
undertaken by the instructors, sometimes by your peers, and 
sometimes by you on the basis of your own criteria (self-evaluation).  
Some parts of each exercise are to be undertaken individually and 
other parts, in groups.  To the latter end, at the beginning of the term, 
you will form yourselves into teams of five or six.  Your team will 
serve not only as a locus for several parts of the assessment process 
during the semester, but also as one of your primary normative 
orders and sites for comparative evaluation in the course. 
 
                                                 
29.  Roderick A. MACDONALD, « Everyday Lessons of Law Teaching – Le 
quotidien de l’enseignement juridique », (2012) Canadian Legal Education 
Annual Review 1.  
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The first series of exercises consists of the following activities: 
 
(1)  Classroom participation – Pass-Fail 
 
You will be expected to engage thoughtfully in each course 
session by: (1) attending class (individual); (2) preparing for class, 
both by addressing a query specifically assigned to you (individual) 
and by considering from a comparative perspective the taxonomic 
criteria that each member of your group has deployed to address the 
question (group); (3) posting comments online (both before and after 
class) on themes being discussed (individual or group, at your option). 
You are free to select the mode and manner of your classroom 
participation, which may involve a variety of expressive forms. 
 
(2) Field trip – Pass-Fail 
 
During the semester, we expect each of you to undertake two 
field trips to sites where you can observe multiple normative orders 
in interaction.  One field trip will be undertaken on your own, the 
other with your group. You will be expected to share your field trip 
experiences with other members of the course by posting an account 
on the relevant online course discussion board. Your posted comments 
should pay particular attention to the implicit dimensions of the 
normative interactions you observe. 
 
The second set of exercises has two parts: 
 
(1) Teaching one seminar session – 33% 
 
 Each group will be responsible for preparing and leading one 
class session over the course of the term. This exercise involves five 
distinct steps: (1) Selecting preparatory materials; (2) Designing a 
lesson plan; (3) Leading a class session; (4) Meeting with us and the 
designated peer evaluators for a de-brief of your class; and (5) 
Submitting a brief group report detailing your pedagogical choices 
and an individual self-evaluation of the session.   
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(2) Peer Evaluation – Pass-Fail 
 
Each student will act as a commentator for a session taught 
by another group. Peer evaluators will be responsible for providing 
individualized written feedback to the session leaders.  In addition, 
there will be a formal peer review session with the session leaders, 
peer evaluators and course instructors.   
 
The third set of exercises (33% of your final grade) concerns 
the normativity that structures the functioning and inter-personal 
interaction between members of your group.  At the beginning of the 
course, your group will record the explicit rules that govern your intra-
group interactions. At the end of the course, you are expected to report 
on the normative order you have created, and its relationship to other 
normative orders that make claims on you in connection with this 
course, developing the comparative dimensions of these orders. You 
should undertake this report in collaboration with your group. 
 
The fourth set of exercises (33% of your final grade), to be 
undertaken individually, is to design and elaborate your own law 
faculty course entitled “Implicit Comparative Law”. This course might 
be an explicit instantiation of the personal learning syllabus that you 
have been formulating (consciously and unconsciously) throughout 
the semester.  Alternatively, you might imagine some other form of 
implicit comparative law course on offer in a law faculty, another 
University unit, a CEGEP, a high school, an elementary school, as 
part of a public legal education programme, or as part of a 
professional primary, continuing or training education programme.  
You are expected to prepare all the materials that are associated with 
designing a course of the type or form you have selected (i.e. a brief 
course description suitable for a public announcement, a course 
syllabus, a reading list, evaluation materials and a grading scheme, 
a detailed description of the course content and pedagogical 
approach for one class session, and any additional foundational 
materials associated with the design of your particular course) and a 
comprehensive text explaining your pedagogical choices. 
 
***** 
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Commentary: 
 
Evaluation, in its many forms and whatever its objectives 
and modalities, is a familiar feature of any course.  However the 
learning objectives of a course may be framed, professors and 
students confront the question:  So what? What have we learned?  
And however these questions are answered, we face its corollaries:  
How do you know?  How can we assess what has, or has not been 
learned?  These latter queries raise especially vexing inquiries when 
the focus of the course under examination is on the implicit 
dimensions of law and legal ordering.  This is because in any 
pedagogical endeavour, one would expect that the hypotheses about 
law that the course proposes and the processes of discovery and 
learning that the course aims to compel are reflected in the 
evaluation processes – that is, in the course assignments and the 
manner of assessment.   
 
It might initially be thought that the section of a syllabus 
devoted to assignments and assessment would not be a significant 
part of our course on Implicit Comparative Law.  There are, 
however, two reasons why we have devoted so much attention to 
assessment. First, given our approach to pedagogy it is impossible 
to distinguish between features of the course that aim at teaching, 
and features that aim at assessment.  In the formative evaluation 
approach, assessment and feedback are a central part of the 
pedagogy, and deserve as much attention as classroom sessions 
and other activities.  Second, the course is about “implicit” 
comparative law.  Consistently with that ambition, we conceive 
much of the learning of the course to take place implicitly.  
Assessments and evaluations do not look like exercises of discovery 
of comparative law, but if they are properly crafted they are 
reflections of the analytical substance of the approach we take to 
this course.  That is, it is the parts of the course that do not 
explicitly present themselves as being about implicit comparative 
law where the lessons of implicit comparative law are most richly 
revealed. 
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In our proposed course, many assessments involve formal 
exercises requiring the submission of written material.  At first 
glance, it would seem that such evaluation methods cannot be 
squared with a pedagogy that focuses on the theory and practices 
of implicit comparative law. However, this would be to misinterpret 
the iterative orientation of all course assignments.  Like our 
understanding of comparative endeavours and of law, we 
understand teaching and learning and, concomitantly, the methods 
and goals of evaluation, to be fluid, narrative, individual and group 
based, formal and informal, and – most importantly – self-reflexive.  
Teaching and learning implicit comparative law requires inquiry 
into human interaction, human purposes and the diverse normative 
modes and sites within which human agency is pursued.  The 
multi-faceted evaluation process we have proposed seeks to 
accommodate and replicate the assumptions and pedagogical 
practices of the course itself.  
 
Given our parameters and presumptions about law and 
about assessment, it is obvious that a sit-down final examination 
would not be an appropriate mode of evaluation for this course.  
Such an exercise is fundamentally summative (a snapshot 
verification of how much specific information has been internalized 
and what specific skills have been mastered).  It is neither formative 
(a further step in the process of discovery and learning that will be 
complemented by extensive feedback leading to additional learning 
opportunities) nor motivational (it does not provide the occasion for 
student-initiated interactive learning). Moreover, given our position 
that the sites and modes of law – and thus of comparative law – are 
boundless, it makes sense that the evaluation components for this 
course require course participants to reflect on what they are 
learning about law both individually and collectively and both inside 
and outside the classroom.  It, further, makes sense that the 
evaluative framework we have constructed is ongoing throughout 
the course and is as concerned with means (how am I learning) as 
with ends (what am I learning).  This is why most of the ungraded 
exercises are meant to have students examine and critique their 
own pedagogical practices, and their own learning mechanisms, as 
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well as to assess these practices and mechanisms in comparison 
with those proposed by their classmates.  
 
In such a conception of assessment, there is no sharp 
distinction between learning and evaluation.  Participating in a field 
trip, writing a diary or log of the course that will form part of an 
end-of-semester report, assessing not only the materials course 
instructors have prepared for individual seminars, but the actual 
performance of the seminar itself, and designing a specific implicit 
comparative law course on a topic of interest are each occasions for 
students to engage with legal comparison in multiple symbolic 
registers.  Consistent with the tenets of the critical legal pluralist 
hypothesis animating this course and with our invitation for 
students to engage with law in its multiple contexts, we encourage 
students to submit their various assignments either in non-
traditional textual formats or in non-textual formats.  
 
Finally, each of the assignments has been crafted so that 
students have considerable latitude in imagining the starting points 
and objects for their submissions.  We hope that most assignments 
will have a strong element of self-reflexivity.  For example, a student 
might design a syllabus for an implicit comparative law course 
around a comparative law conference programme: what topics were 
included? what topics were not discussed? what theories of 
comparison were adopted by different authors?  In every instance, 
the assignment will require students not just to address questions 
such as those just posed, but also to explain what alternatives they 
had contemplated and why these alternatives were rejected. 
 
Here is another example of how reflexivity could be 
demonstrated in a written assignment.  A student might consider 
writing a field trip report about attendance at the 50th Anniversary 
Conference of the Quebec Society of Comparative Law.  In such a 
report, what might be particularly interesting would be a report or 
commentary that also examined the already mentioned 
transformation of the Society’s name. What epistemological and 
ontological assumptions about the very idea of comparison in law 
can be seen in the substitution of the name "Quebec Society of 
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Comparative Law" for the initial name "Quebec Association for the 
Comparative Study of Law"?  and were any of those assumptions 
explicit in the thinking of those who proposed and supported the 
change? Such a report could then go on to consider possible future 
name changes for the Society – perhaps to the "Quebec Society for 
the Study of Approaches to Implicit Comparative Law" or the 
"Quebec Society for the Comparative Study of Implicit Law" or, 
perhaps even more appropriate, the "Quebec Society for the 
Comparative Study of Legal Epistemologies".  Preparing such a 
report would require the student to embark upon and map an 
intellectual journey akin to the individual journeys that we 
chronicled in the Synopsis and Rationale section of the syllabus.30   
 
G. Feedback 
 
Underlying the notion of implicit comparative law developed in 
this course are several assumptions about law inherent in the critical 
legal pluralist hypothesis.  To recall, law is conceived as (1) 
interactional, (2) polycentric, (3) facilitative, and (4) not exclusively 
chirographic.  In keeping with these premises, the feedback 
mechanisms in this course are meant to offer opportunities for all 
participants – as teachers and students – to contribute to each other’s 
learning.  Accordingly, we institutionalize several channels of 
communication among course participants, while also recognizing 
that informal feedback is inevitable, fruitful and most reflective of the 
second-order objectives and learning outcomes outlined earlier.  
 
Most obviously, feedback among course participants is a 
mechanism for assessing how well the course objectives are being 
attained.  Formal feedback by way of questionnaire is especially 
helpful for making specific adjustments to improve the course on the 
                                                 
30.  The exercise of contrasting assumptions that are carried by different 
arrangements of the words in a title applies as much to the title of this 
course as it does to the name of the association that sponsored the 
conference at which this essay was presented.  For example, students 
could be invited to write a report comparing the assumptions that would 
change were this course entitled “Comparative Implicit Law” rather than 
“Implicit Comparative Law”. 
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fly and for reimagining its components for future years.  Informal, 
unstructured feedback complements these goals and also tends to 
identify unintended or unexpected learning outcomes and to generate 
unusual and innovative proposals concerning both substantive 
objectives and pedagogical strategies. But feedback is not simply 
about measuring achievement. The endeavour of providing feedback 
is itself a teaching-learning opportunity.  Peer evaluation by students 
(by ricochet) and self-evaluation (directly) engage course participants 
in the central intellectual processes of comparison and self-reflection.   
 
(1) Our feedback to you 
 
We will provide you with ongoing feedback on all aspects of 
your performance in this course, including written comments on each 
assessment.  The evaluation criteria, posted on the website, will 
orient our comments. Also, we invite you to propose to us your own 
criteria by which you would like us to assess your performance. In 
addition to our willingness to discuss the course and your concerns 
in informal settings like Coffee House, we also undertake to respond 
promptly to e-mails and to postings on discussion boards on the 
course webpage. We are available during our office hours, by 
appointment and before/after class to discuss the course and your 
performance and progress in it.  In keeping with the interactive 
character of the course, on several occasions during the semester, we 
will also be posting on the website our self-evaluation of our own 
contributions. 
 
 (2) Your feedback to us 
 
 We welcome your feedback about all aspects of this course.  If 
warranted by the size of enrollment, we will create a class committee 
to meet with us every three weeks to review any matter relating to 
the course. In either the presence or absence of such a committee, 
you are encouraged to communicate with us about the course at any 
time by speaking with us after class, contacting us by phone or email, 
submitting comments via the anonymous feedback forms (available 
on the course website), posting comments on the course website, or 
completing a formal evaluation during the course evaluation period.   
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(3) Your feedback to each other (peer evaluation) 
 
As you know from the modes of assessment, you are each 
expected to evaluate a class session taught by a group of your 
classmates.  The class discussion board and other tools on the web-
site also provide opportunities for you to give formal feedback to each 
other during the course of the semester.  Finally, and once again in 
keeping with the informal aspects of the course, you should be aware 
that the manner of your interaction through everyday classroom 
participation is a powerful implicit feedback mechanism that can be 
deployed to contribute to your own learning, as well as that of your 
classmates.  
 
 (4) Your feedback to yourselves (self-evaluation) 
 
 Part of two course assignments – the teaching of a class and 
the design of your own course – involve you submitting a self-
evaluation of your performance.  In addition to these formal occasions 
for you to reflect on your participation in and contribution to the 
learning of others in the course, we hope that you will keep an 
informal diary to track your reactions to individual classes, to 
assigned materials and to the engagement of other course 
participants.  In section C of this syllabus – Specific Learning 
Outcomes – we signal that the course is meant to be self-reflexive.  
Your continual self-evaluation, making use of the entire range of 
explicit and implicit normative resources canvassed in the course, is 
the most important vehicle you have for assessing how well you are 
coming to understand the diverse possibilities for learning law that are 
opened up by the implicit comparative law hypothesis. 
 
***** 
 
Commentary: 
 
In any course, timely and thoughtful feedback among the 
participants is crucial to achieving the course objectives.  In 
important respects, evaluation is personal and is conditioned by 
how well or how poorly other course participants are performing.  
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Ultimately, however, assessment and feedback in formal education 
settings are comparative exercises; course instructors are required 
to assess and report on performance and progress according to 
some formal criteria and to differentiate and group students, 
usually on a pass-fail basis, or by means of numerical letter grades.  
 
As with the section of the syllabus devoted to assignments 
and assessment, it might be thought that the section on feedback 
has little to do with the substance of a course on Implicit 
Comparative Law.  But because our theoretical approach is critical 
legal pluralism, in which everyone is a law-creating agent, the 
occasions for feedback are central moments in the development of 
the normative regime that governs the relationship among course 
participants.  Moreover, how each student constructs and navigates 
this regime is an important site for comparative analysis.  Such 
analysis is multi-dimensional, but we seek to encourage two types 
of comparative reflection in particular. First is the exercise of 
situating one’s own construction of the normative regime in relation 
to that of others.  What are the modes and mechanisms of 
interaction between these regimes and the individuals and norms 
within them? Second is the exercise of situating one’s own 
construction of the present normative regime in relation to those of 
the past and of the future.  How do the multiple instantiations of 
self at one particular time and over time contribute to norm 
creation, interaction and change? For these reasons we feel it is 
important to provide a detailed exposition of how different forms of 
feedback serve as modes and sites through which these individual 
legal systems are configured, experienced and communicated by 
members of the seminar.   
 
In other words, in this course we attempt to align our 
processes of feedback with our processes of assessment, and to 
structure both so as to reinforce the course objectives.  For example, 
evaluations are conceived primarily as a mode of providing 
feedback. The character and quality of student assignments 
provides feedback to instructors, just as commentary on submitted 
work provides feedback to students.  The exercises of evaluation 
and feedback inevitably host a comparative dimension, as all 
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participants necessarily locate themselves by reference to the 
performance of others.  As instructors, we therefore need criteria of 
aggregation and differentiation that permit us to tailor feedback to 
the assignment and to the student submitting the assignment. That 
said, feedback from multiple evaluators is never identical, either in 
its reference points, in its modes of expression, in its degree of 
explicitness or in its commitment to the instrumental triptych of 
objective, performance, assessment.  
 
Accordingly, both the explicit and implicit feedback 
mechanisms that are embedded in our syllabus reflect the multi-
dimensional quality of the instructor-student relationship. Not only 
are the sites of feedback multiple, the symbolic form in which 
feedback is provided and the purposes and features of providing 
feedback are multiple.  Indeed, if all feedback is comparative, 
informal feedback that does not even announce itself as such 
instantiates the same types of implicit comparison that are present 
in the everyday pedagogy of the course. 
 
Finally, the cumulative effect of the exchange of feedback 
between instructor and students and among students themselves 
becomes an exercise in comparative law.  Participants must ask, 
“On what basis can the criteria, forms and character of feedback be 
compared?” And, having posed this question, they must then 
compare how these messages of the unofficial and implicit feedback 
vehicles either reinforce or differ from those transmitted by the 
course’s official and explicit feedback mechanisms.  
 
H. Week-by-Week Outline of Seminar Sessions 
 
Week 1 Introduction 
 
Part One:  Introduction to Comparative Law 
 
Week 2 Identity, comparison, commensurability 
Week 3  Knowledge, language, communication 
Week 4 What law?  Critical legal pluralism 
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Week 5 What comparison?  Implicit and inferential legal 
normativity 
 
Part Two:  Case Studies – Sites of Comparative Legal Analysis 
 
Week 6 Legal orders, legal systems, legal families, legal 
traditions 
Week 7 Legal institutions for making, administering and 
applying law 
Week 8 Legal doctrine – norms, concepts, procedures  
Week 9 Legal education – is and ought in legal comparison 
 
Part Three:  Case Studies – Modes of Comparative Legal 
Analysis 
 
Week 10 Endogenous (conceptual) legal comparison 
Week 11 Exogenous (functional) legal comparison 
Week 12 Inputs – Temporal legal comparison 
Week 13 Outputs – Harmonization, transplants and viral 
propagation 
Week 14 Conclusion 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
A course syllabus is always aspirational.  In its explicit 
presentation, it erects the scaffolding on which a course is 
constructed and reconstructed by the course participants as 
scholastic terms unfold. In its implicit and inferential dimensions, 
a syllabus aims to propel a course forward without constraining the 
participants’ experiences, learning processes and outcomes.  
Explicit in the syllabus for our particular instantiation of an implicit 
comparative law course is the proposition that re-imagining 
comparative law as implicit comparative law entails a taxonomic 
shift and a multiplication of potential comparative units.  New 
categories of comparison emerge, along with new sites of 
comparative inquiry, and new modes, schema and distributions of 
comparison. But, as is also explicit in the articulation and design of 
our course, much more significant than the magnification and 
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multiplication of comparative quantity are the hermeneutic and 
qualitative shifts that implicit comparative law entails.  The meta-
shift disrupts the meaning and presence of comparative law 
(existential), the sources of legal and comparative knowledge 
(epistemological) and the sites, processes and outcomes of 
comparison (ontological).  
 
Traditional comparative law has often seemed to assume that 
a single homogenous legal order defines a legal territory and that 
that defining legal order (and its homogeneity) are commensurable 
with the defining orders of other political territories.31 It is true that 
when we contemplate, theorize, teach and write the law, we (most 
often implicitly) privilege a particular location – species, genus, 
order, family.  It is also true that when we contemplate, theorize, 
teach and write the law, we make (most often implicitly) substantive 
choices about our organizing frames: sometimes these frames are 
sites of law (the courtroom, the battlefield, the highway, the home 
or legal families, traditions or system); sometimes modes of legal 
expression (statute, conversation, case law, contract); sometimes 
disciplinary extroversions that police the boundaries of inquiry 
(securities law, intellectual property, comparative law).  When our 
intellectual endeavours in law announce themselves as being 
comparative, these privileging choices are more explicit.32 However, 
                                                 
31.  This is not to say that the law in action is ignored; the claim, rather, is 
that outcomes are always predicated on a reference to formal law.  
Compare the analysis in Christopher A. WHYTOCK, « Legal Origins, 
Functionalism, and the Future of Comparative Law », (2009) 6 Brigham 
Young University Law Review 1879. 
32.  For example, in the Glennian tradition the rubric of "legal tradition" offers 
a way of situating the varying global meanings and roles of Law and laws 
as part of “the changing presence of the past”: H. Patrick GLENN, Legal 
Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law, 4th ed., New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 22. Glenn offers the following list of legal 
traditions: Chthonic, Talmudic, Civil, Islamic, Common, Hindu, and Asian.  
For another definition of "legal tradition" (that is, as “set of deeply rooted, 
historically conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, about the role 
of law in the society and the polity, about the way law is or should be 
made, applied, studied, perfected, and taught .… [that] puts the legal 
system into cultural perspective”), see John Henry MERRYMAN and Rogelio 
PÉREZ-PERDOMO, The Civil Law Tradition, 3rd ed., Palo Alto, Stanford 
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whether explicit or implicit, intentional or unconscious, the 
privileging choices almost always disclose a presumption that at 
some relatively low level of abstraction, differences are 
commensurable.  That is, the common view seems to be that 
abstraction can reveal a common lexicon in which particular 
differences can be noticed, measured, evaluated and learned from.  
 
All abstractions are intended to regroup and differentiate.  
However, at some level of abstraction, distinctions between units of 
comparison disappear from view. In physical terms, the notion is 
captured by the zoom out function on GoogleMaps, which, with 
increased retraction from Earth, homogenizes the indicators of 
human life and differentiation into large-scale blends of 
topographical features.33 The lesson of implicit comparative law is, 
                                                 
University Press, 2007, p. 2.  Alternatively, David and Brierley posit "legal 
family" as the criterion of classification, with designations assigned on the 
basis of the ease of cognitive mobility between jurisdictions and the 
absence of diverging foundational propositions: René DAVID and John E.C. 
BRIERLEY, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An Introduction to the 
Comparative Study of Law, 3rd ed., London, Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1985, p. 
12.  David and Brierley identify the following major contemporary families 
of law: Romano-Germanic, the common law, socialist laws, and 
philosophical or religious systems. 
33.  If we plot a location on a GoogleMap, we can zoom in to view that location 
at a level replicating physical presence.  From this perspective, the 
distinctions between buildings, bricks, license plates and advertisements 
are discernible, easily so.  Indeed, these distinctions remain in focus – and 
may even sharpen – as we slowly zoom out.  However, beyond a certain 
point, each click of the "zoom out" button blurs sharp distinctions. As the 
view pulls back from the Earth, streets, airports and trees blend into 
abstract configurations of gray and green.  Continued zooming out blends 
boundaries further, creating a topography of urban spaces juxtaposed 
with apparently uninhabited areas of varying elevations and forestation 
levels.  Ultimately, only the distinctions between land and water, snow and 
forest remain.  We find an analogous example of the blurring of 
distinctions in the conceptual foundations of Christianity.  According to 
this tradition, the sins of and distinctions between particular individuals 
disappear in the presence of God, that is, the insurmountable imperfection 
of human finitude becomes immanent and collective in the presence of 
God’s infinite perfection: see e.g. « The Rev. Dr. Boynton’s Prayer » in 
Christopher L. WEBBER  (ed.), An American Prayer Book, Harrisburg, 
Morehouse Publishing, 2008, p. 80. In yet a different context, Oliver 
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however, not that distinctions vanish in the presence of the infinite. 
We learn, rather, that whenever and wherever we perform 
aggregations, we make choices. Because of the analytical rigour 
that taxonomy purchases, we often fail to acknowledge the 
contingency of these choices, and the politics they reflect.34  Indeed, 
these choices often seem like natural or optimal ones, but 
ultimately – indeed, fundamentally – these choices are neither 
necessary nor ideal.  Rather, the lines we draw in our decision-
making and choice-selection efforts are grounded in deliberation 
and purpose.  In other words, all intermediate distinctions – 
between conceptions of infinity – are products of judgment.   
 
In recognition of these exercises of personal volition and 
circumspection, implicit in our syllabus is the unstated hope that, 
by the end of our Implicit Comparative Law course, students will 
have come to the realization that privileged choices at the level of 
abstraction are arbitrary (that is, discretionary) but not capricious 
(that is, not careless or whimsical).35 The aim of implicit 
                                                 
Wendell Holmes noted the effect of abstraction on difference by using 
mathematical theory as a simile for certain realms of jurisprudence. “I do 
not say”, he wrote, “that there is not a wider point of view from which the 
distinction between law and morals becomes of secondary or no 
importance, as all mathematical distinctions vanish in the presence of the 
infinite”: Oliver Wendell HOLMES, Jr., « The Path of Law », (1897) 10 
Harvard L. Rev. 457, p. 459. Holmes was of the view that the distinction 
was important to the “right study and mastery of the law as a business 
with well understood limits, a body of dogma enclosed within definite 
lines”. 
34.  R. A. MACDONALD, « Is Law a Zoo? », supra, note 2.  
35.  “All normative regimes are radically heterogeneous in every artefactual  
ambitions.  Moreover, all normative regimes are in constant flux; over time 
not only their institutional, methodological, procedural and substantive 
content, but even their basic orientations seem to mutate.  Given the 
complexity of modern western societies, the political attempt to eliminate 
(and the intellectual attempt to reconcile) normative dissonance – be it 
within any normative order, or across normative orders – would be futile.  
To model consonance is an instrumental goal requiring conscious effort 
that already implies a privileging of a particular archetype of legal 
normativity and a particular conception of a normative regime”: R. A. 
MACDONALD, « Critical legal Pluralism as a Construction of Normativity and 
the Emergence of Law », supra, note 24.  
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comparative law is to change both the scale and the register of 
judgment in the comparative analysis.  The ultimate reductio on an 
implicit comparative law approach is not infinity, but rather the 
individual – for that human being is not just the subject of law, but 
in each of the multiple normative regimes that compete for loyalty 
and adherence, is also law-maker and law-applier.  Individuals 
invoke comparison – whether implicitly or explicitly, exclusively or 
in tandem with other modalities, superficially or reflexively – as a 
strategy for structuring their categories of knowledge and 
understanding their place in the world.  It is, at bottom, a strategy 
that presupposes an exercise of distinguishing self from other. 
Implicit comparative law aspires to empower individuals to make 
the choices that they consider compelling and to conceive of the 
other in a way that is personally meaningful, whether that be tied 
to the law of another state or legal tradition, the local law, the law 
of organizations, transnational law, or the law of the everyday.   
 
Appendix: Annotated Bibliography  
 
No course will ever be complete in its own terms.  It will always 
open doors to that which lies beyond the formal tuition. The written 
syllabus to which this Appendix is attached is, at best, the formulaic 
expression of the pedagogical content of the course.  Classroom 
sessions will take us into the realm of the interactional and the 
inferential.  At such a point, the course becomes an invitation to 
further inquiry and reflection.  To assist you in this endeavor, we 
have prepared a general bibliography of works that take up themes 
suggested in this course.  It should be read as a whole, as the sources 
cited under one heading often implicate a range of relevant 
material.36 
 
The Foundations of Comparative Legal Knowledge 
 
Comparison is a mechanism of social navigation, 
communication, evaluation and interaction; it offers a way of 
                                                 
36.  The use of italics in the presentation of this Appendix indicates (correctly) 
that the Annotated Bibliography contained therein attaches to our course 
syllabus.  Indeed, the Annotated Bibliography is our attempt to offer our 
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knowing (epistemology), an aspect of being (ontology), a vehicle for 
meaning (semantics) and an education in virtue (ethics); it is a 
fundamental reflex of the human species. Moreover, comparative 
methods, theories and analyses have become mainstays of legal 
study.  The seminal texts of 20th century North American and Western 
European comparative law are multiple and their staying power is 
manifest.  See: Rudolph SCHLESINGER, Comparative Law: Cases and 
Materials, Brooklyn, Foundation Press, 1950 (the 7th edition – 
Schlesinger’s Comparative Law – authored by Ugo Mattei, Teemu 
Ruskola and Antonio Gidi, was published in 2009); Arthur VON 
MEHREN, The Civil Law System: Cases and Materials for the 
Comparative Study of Law, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1957 
(the 2nd edition – The Civil Law System: An Introduction to the 
Comparative Study of Law – written with James R. Gordley was 
published in Boston by Little Brown & Co in 1977); René DAVID, Les 
grands systèmes de droit contemporains, Paris, Dalloz, 1964 (the 
11th edition, with Camille JAUFFRET-SPINOSI, was published in 2002) 
                                                 
students a survey of the sources that facilitated the design and 
construction of the course and of materials through which they can 
undertake a more searching inquiry into and beyond the formal and 
obligatory course coverage. Our intentions for the Annotated Bibliography 
are, however, not exclusively bound to the tuition of our proposed course.  
Rather, the Annotated Bibliography attaches simultaneously to the course 
syllabus and to this paper as a whole. Accordingly, it not only charts a 
path for students, but also symbolizes our own (past, present and future) 
route to an idea of implicit comparative law. For the most thorough 
account of the sources paving that route, the Annotated Bibliography 
should be read in conjunction with the Primary Reference Materials 
section of the syllabus (II.D) and the footnotes attached to the Commentary 
portions of this paper.  That said, such a reading should not be interpreted 
as a claim that students in the seminar should replicate the intellectual 
journey laid out in the Primary Reference Materials and the Annotated 
Bibliography. A claim of that order misunderstands the nature and 
objectives of the course.  Rather, recall our assumption that students will 
critically engage with and assess the obligatory and primary reference 
materials set out in the syllabus (II.D).  In conjunction, we expect students 
in the seminar to interrogate the substance and form of the Annotated 
Bibliography itself, as well as the sources listed in it, to determine whether 
the organization of knowledge and assumptions they embody comport with 
their own understanding and practice of implicit comparative law, and to 
formulate a compilation of sources that best symbolizes their own 
individual journey.  
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(see also the English version, René DAVID and John E.C. BRIERLEY, 
Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An Introduction to the 
Comparative Study of Law, London, Steven & Sons, 1968 (the 3rd 
edition was published in 1985)); John Henry MERRYMAN, The Civil 
Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western 
Europe and Latin America, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 
1969 (the 3rd edition was published in 2007); Konrad ZWEIGERT and 
Hein KOTZ, Introduction to Comparative Law, Amsterdam, North 
Holland Publishing Co., 1977 (the 3rd revised edition was published 
by Clarendon Press in 1998); Peter DECRUZ, Comparative Law in a 
Changing World, London, Cavendish, 1995 (the 3rd edition was 
published in 2007); H. Patrick GLENN, Legal Traditions of the World: 
Sustainable Diversity in Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 
2000 (the 4th edition was published in 2010).  
 
A range of additional perspectives that stand as prominent 
contributions to the development of comparative legal thought are 
found in the following works: Bronislaw MALINOWSKI, Crime and 
Custom in a Savage Society, Paterson, NJ, Littlefield Adams, 1926; 
John Henry WIGMORE, A Panorama of the World’s Legal Systems, 
Saint Paul, West Publishing Co., 1928; Max RHEINSTEIN, «Teaching 
Comparative Law», (1938) 5 U. Chicago L. Rev. 615; Marc ANCEL, 
Utilité et méthodes de droit comparé, Éléments d’introduction 
générale à l’étude comparative des droits, Neuchâtel, Éditions Ides 
et calends, 1971; Max RHEINSTEIN, «The Family and the Law», in Max 
RHEINSTEIN (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, 
vol. IV, Persons and Family, Paris, Mohr, 1973; Rodolfo SACCO, La 
comparison juridique au service de la connaissance de droit, Paris, 
Economica, 1991; Calum CARMICHAEL (ed.), Collected Works of 
David Daube, 4 vols., Berkeley, University of California, 1992; Pierre 
LEGRAND and Roderick MUNDAY (eds.), Comparative Legal Studies: 
Traditions and Transitions, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2003; Roger COTTERRELL, Law, Culture and Society, Aldershot, 
Ashgate, 2006; and Gilles Cuniberti, Grands systèmes de droit 
contemporains, 2nd ed., Paris, L.G.D.J., 2011.           
 
In embarking on a re-imagination of the meta-hypotheses of 
comparative law, we take a cue from observations of comparative 
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law’s “identity crisis” and other indications of uncertainty and 
dissatisfaction within the field: John W. HEAD, Great Legal 
Traditions: Civil Law, Common Law, and Chinese Law in Historical 
and Operational Perspective, Durham, NC, Carolina Academic Press, 
2011; Esin ÖRÜCÜ and David NELKEN (eds.), Comparative Law: A 
Handbook, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007, especially the 
contributions by Örücü, Twining, and Menski; Esin ÖRÜCÜ, The 
Enigma of Comparative Law: Variations on a Theme for the Twenty-
first Century, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2004; Bernhard GROSSFELD, 
Core Questions of Comparative Law, Durham, NC, Carolina 
Academic Press, 2005, translated by Vivian Grosswalk Curran; 
Jerome HALL, Comparative Law and Society Theory, Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana State University Press, 1963; Maurice ADAMS, «Doing What 
Doesn’t Come Naturally.  On the Distinctiveness of Comparative Law» 
in Mark VAN HOECKE (ed.), Methodologies of Legal Research: Which 
Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline?, Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2011, p. 229; David S. CLARK, «Comparative Legal 
Systems» in David Scott CLARK (ed.), Encyclopedia of Law and 
Society: American and Global Perspectives, Thousand Oaks, CA, 
SAGE, 2007, p. 224; Annelise RILES, ed., Rethinking the Masters of 
Comparative Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2001; Edward EBERLE, 
«The Method and Role of Comparative Law», (2009) 8 Washington 
University Global Studies Law Review 451.  
 
The Pedagogy of Comparative Law 
 
The theory of transsystemic teaching embodied by the McGill 
Programme provides that private law courses are taught without a 
“pedigree designation” as civil or common.  As Professor Shauna Van 
Praagh explains in her preface to the McGill Law Journal’s special 
issue, «Navigating the Transsystemic», (2005) 50 McGill L.J. 701ff, 
understanding the McGill Programme entails active reflection on 
relationships, in particular, relationships between norms and 
sources; between law, culture, philosophy and time; between 
normative orders, traditions, approaches and practices; and between 
individuals, aspirations and social transformation.  For more 
searching and particularized explorations of the theory and practice 
of McGill’s transsystemic programme, see:  
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(a) with respect to the epistemic and conceptual shifts at stake 
in a transsystemic approach: Roderick A. MACDONALD and Jason 
MACLEAN, «No Toilets in Park», above, II.D (a shift to “constitutive 
polyjurality”, a term symbolizing the unification of a transformation 
from mono or bi-jurality to polyjurality and a revitalization of the 
constitutive ambition); H. Patrick GLENN, «Doin’ the Transsystemic: 
Legal Systems and Legal Traditions», (2005) 50 McGill L.J. 863 (a 
shift beyond the systemic to where the normative action is, namely, 
the legal tradition); Richard JANDA, «Toward Cosmopolitan Law». 
(2005) 50 McGill L.J. 967 (a shift from law to cosmopolitan law, and 
from a universal law of hospitality to a hospitality among plural legal 
orders);  
 
(b) in relation to mapping the implications of a pluralist 
conception of law for the normative experience: Jacques P. 
VANDERLINDEN, «Une lecture du système normatif de l’Église 
catholique par un pluraliste comparatiste aux personnalités 
multiples», above, II.D (by asking whether canon law is law or 
theology); Emmanuel MELISSARIS, «The Chronology of the Legal», 
(2005) 50 McGill L.J. 839 (by exploring the "chronos" of law); and 
Etienne LE ROY, « Bricolages anthropologiques pour promouvoir, en 
Afrique et ailleurs, un dialogue entre univers juridiques » (2005) 50 
McGill L.J. 951 (by investigating the cultural dimensions of 
juridicity);  
 
(c) in relation to articulating the experience and aspiration of 
transsystemia “on the ground”: Rosalie JUKIER, «Where Law and 
Pedagogy Meet in the Transsystemic Contracts Classroom», (2005) 50 
McGill L.J. 789 (using the example of specific performance as 
reflecting the transsystemic move from the sequential to the 
integrated and from perspectives to legal traditions) and Susan 
DRUMMOND, «Prolegomenon to a Pedestrian Cartography of Mixed 
Legal Jurisdictions: The Case of Israel/Palestine», (2005) 50 McGill 
L.J. 899 (reconceptualizing what mixed legal jurisdictions are by 
looking to the example of Israel and Palestine);  
 
(d) with respect the confrontation between institutional 
maturation and practical challenges: Harry ARTHURS, «Madly off in 
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One Direction: McGill’s New Integrated, Polyjural, Transsystemic Law 
Programme», above, II.D; and  
 
(e) in relation to the human agency required to navigate the 
transsystemic: Shauna VAN PRAAGH, «Preface», (2005) 50 McGill L.J. 
701 and Thomas R. BERGER, «One Man’s Justice: My Life in the 
Courts» (2005) 50 McGill L.J. 987. 
 
Course Objectives 
 
Objective One: Beyond explicit, formal law 
 
Human interaction is fundamentally plural.  The four-cell 
matrix presented in this syllabus is one way to symbolize the 
diversity, heterogeneity and complexity of the normativity of human 
interaction.  Detailed elaborations of the matrix model are found in 
Roderick A. MACDONALD, «Vers la reconnaissance d’une normativité 
implicite et inférentille», (1986) XVIII Sociologie et Sociétés 48 and 
Roderick A. MACDONALD, « Les vieilles gardes: hypothèses sur 
l’émergence des normes, l’internormativité et le désordre à travers 
une typologie des institutions normatives » in Jean-Guy BELLEY (ed.), 
Le droit soluble: Contributions québécoises à l’étude de 
l’internormativité, Paris, Librarie générale de droit et de 
jurisprudence, 1996, p. 233.  Diagrams of the contemplated matrix 
can be found at page 53 of the former essay and page 246 of the 
latter.  To explore the distinction between diagonally opposite 
quadrants of the matrix and the spectrum of phenomena that the 
matrix can accommodate, compare traditional conceptions of 
manifest legal phenomena with the fridge door statute (latent) 
detailed in Roderick A. MACDONALD, «The Fridge-Door Statute», (2001) 
47 McGill L.J. 11. 
 
Objective Two: Beyond State Legal Positivism 
 
Contemporary scholarship on pluralist approaches and 
understandings of law is extensive. The literature spans the doctrinal 
to the social scientific to the critical.  For an introduction to a range of 
pluralist perspectives, compare the essays of Lon Fuller collected in 
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K. WINSTON (ed.), The Principles of Social Order: Selected Essays of 
Lon L Fuller, Revised Edition, Durham, Duke University Press, 2002; 
John GRIFFITHS, «What is Legal Pluralism?», (1986) 24 J. of Legal 
Pluralism 1; Sally ENGLE MERRY, «Legal Pluralism», (1988) 22 Law & 
Society Review 869; Brian Z. TAMANAHA, «The Folly of the ‘Social 
Scientific’ Conception of Legal Pluralism» (1993) 20 J. L. & Soc’y 192; 
Brian Z. TAMANAHA, «A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism», 
(2000) 27 J. Law & Soc’y 296; E. MELISSARIS, «The More the Merrier? 
A New Take on Legal Pluralism», (2004) 13 Soc. & Legal Stud. 57; 
and Daniel JUTRAS, «The Legal Dimensions of Everyday Life», (2001) 
16 C.J.L.S. 65.  For taxonomic analyses and critique of the multiple 
versions of the legal pluralist hypothesis, see KLEINHANS and 
MACDONALD, above, II.D and MACDONALD, «Here, There… and 
Everywhere: Theorizing Legal Pluralism; Theorizing Jacques 
Vanderlinden», above, II.D.  
 
Objective Three: Beyond individuals as external legal objects 
 
The key sources on the theoretical origins of critical legal 
pluralism are listed in the Primary Reference Materials section of this 
syllabus. For a sample of integrated and intricate contributions to the 
projects of critical legal pluralism and of overcoming the "isms" of 
Anglo-American state legal positivism, see:  
 
(a) in respect of everyday life: Roderick A. MACDONALD, 
Lessons of Everyday Law, Montreal, McGill-Queen’s Press, 2002;  
 
(b) in respect of issues of governance and law-making: 
Roderick A. MACDONALD, «Unitary Law Re-form, Pluralistic Law Re-
Substance: Illuminating Legal Change», (2007) La. L. Rev. 1113; 
Roderick A. MACDONALD, «Triangulating Social Law Reform» in Ysolde 
GENDREAU (ed.), Dessiner la société par le droit/Mapping Society 
Through Law, Montreal, Éditions Thémis, 2004, p. 117; Roderick A. 
MACDONALD, «Legislation and Governance» in Willem WITTEVEEN and 
Wibren VAN DER BURG (eds.), Rediscovering Fuller: Essays on 
Implicit Law and Institutional Design, Amsterdam, Amsterdam 
University Press, 1999, p. 279;  
 
 
(2013) 43 R.D.U.S. Implicit Comparative Law 191 
  
 
 
 
 
 
(c) in relation to identity and multiculturalism: Roderick A. 
MACDONALD, «Legal Republicanism and Legal Pluralism: Two Takes 
on Identity and Diversity» in Michele GRAZIADEI and Mauro BUSSANI 
(eds.), Human Diversity and the Law, Paris, Harmattan, 2005, p. 43; 
Roderick A. MACDONALD, «Recognizing and Legitimating Aboriginal 
Justice: Implications for a Reconstruction of Non-Aboriginal Legal 
Systems in Canada» in ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, 
Aboriginal Peoples and the Justice System, Ottawa, Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1992, p. 232;  
 
(d) in relation to international trading regimes: Roderick A. 
MACDONALD, «Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes and 
Legal Pluralism», (1998) 15 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 69; Roderick A. 
MACDONALD, «Three Metaphors of Norm Migration in International 
Context», (2009) 34 Brooklyn J. of Int’l L. 603; and  
 
(e) with respect to human rights: Roderick A. MACDONALD, 
«Pluralistic Human Rights? Universal Human Wrongs?» in R. PROVOST 
and C. SHEPPARD (eds.), Dialogues on Human Rights and Legal 
Pluralism, Springer, forthcoming in 2012.  For more examples of 
works from some of these categories, see MACDONALD, «Here, There… 
and Everywhere: Theorizing Legal Pluralism; Theorizing Jacques 
Vanderlinden», above, II.D, at pages 382-383. 
 
Course Content 
 
The facts of the financing example that we rely on in this 
syllabus were borrowed from Roderick A. Macdonald and Jason 
McLean’s analysis of its possibilities in the transsystemic context in 
«No Toilets in Park», above, II.D. That article presents another example 
from the transsystemic curricular model that is instructive for 
conceptualizing our approach to implicit comparative law.  The 
example – an introductory survey course about the foundations of 
Canadian law – is a key site for cautioning students against the 
perils of reifying the transsystemic idea, essentialism and effacing 
the personal in understanding legal concepts. A “Foundations” 
course in a non-reified transsystemic curriculum would focus on 
contingency and agency in examining how legal subjects actively 
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imagine and engage with multiple legal orders.  Furthermore, for a 
discussion of how abandoning the default criteria for defining 
cognates and agnates in the comparative law analysis and how the 
emergent factors play out in the context of transnational commercial 
law reform, see Roderick A. MACDONALD, «Article 9 Norm 
Entrepreneurship» (2006) 43 Can. Bus. L.J. 240 and Roderick A. 
MACDONALD, «Three Metaphors of International Norm Migration», 
above. 
 
Assessments & Feedback 
 
The language and registers of law and legal inquiry are 
simultaneously oft-ignored as inherent and oft-criticized as political.  
Several accounts impel us to challenge the linguistic and planar 
orthodoxies of legal study: Roderick A. MACDONALD, «Legal 
Bilingualism», (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 119; Roderick A. MACDONALD 
and Clarisse KEHLER SIEBERT, «Orchestrating Legal Multilingualism: 
12 Études» in J.C. GÉMAR and N. KAISIRER (eds.), Jurilinguistique: 
entre langues et droits, Montreal, Éditions Thémis, 2005, p. 377; 
Roderick A. MACDONALD, «Office Politics», (1990) 40 U.T.L.J. 419; 
Roderick A. MACDONALD and Jonathan WIDELL, «Office Politics 
(Again)!», (2005) 20 C.J.L.S. 1; Roderick A. MACDONALD, «Custom 
made – For a Non-Chirographic Critical Legal Pluralism», above, II.D. 
 
Challenging orthodoxy in the classroom entails an appropriate 
approach to facilitation, evaluation and communication between 
course participants. Our approach to assessment and feedback is 
concerned, first and foremost, with learning and learners.  For a 
discussion of the distinction between summative and formative 
evaluation and the methods and practices of formative evaluation 
and feedback, see: Phil RACE, «The Art of Assessing», (1995) 4 New 
Academic; Graham MOWL, «Innovative Assessment», online: 
<http://www.city.londonmet.ac.uk/deliberations/assessment/mo
wl_fr.html>; Barbara GROSS DAVIS, «Grading Practices» in Barbara 
GROSS DAVID, Tools for Teaching, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass 
Publishers,1993; Gerald F. HESS and Steven FRIEDLAND, Techniques 
for Teaching Law, Durham, NC, Carolina University Press, 1999. 
 
